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Abstract 
Because of apparently close ties between banks and industry, German-style universal 
banking is thought by many to improve investment efficiency. This paper presents new 
evidence to the contrary. Using a panel of firm data from Germany's heavy industrializa­
tion period ( 1903-1913 ) , the analysis shows that investment is more sensitive to internal 
liquidity for bank-networked firms than unattached firms , and that this effect is only 
minimally offset in the long run. Furthermore, the paper presents extensive evidence on 
the characteristics of bank-attached firms and demonstrates through direct tests that the 
estimated investment equations are free of selection bias . 
Relationship Banking, Liquidity, and Investment: 
Lessons from the German Industrialization 
Caroline Fohlin* 
Universal banking has received a. great deal of attention .of late . As banking regula­
tion loosens in the United States and efforts toward industrial redevelopment in eastern 
Europe intensify, economists have begun to wonder what type of financial system will 
promote the greatest stability and strongest growth in the economy. Germany and Japan , 
whose large universal banks are often credited with the post-World War II industrial suc­
cesses of these economies , have been the starting points for several recent investigations .1  
The current interest in universal banking, however, is  more of a revival than an inno­
vation . Economists and historians have long suggested that financial institutions play a 
vital role in industrial development , and the German universal banks of the pre-World 
War I era have often been singled out as the prime example .2 These banks , which com­
bined short-term commercial lending with long-term investment banking, are thought to 
have fostered long-term relationships with industrial firms ; allowing more efficient and 
stronger investment . 
While powerful influence has been attributed to Germany's universal banks , little 
systematic evidence has been provided to support these assertions . Given the extent 
to which modern conceptions of relationship banking are based on the received wisdom 
about pre-war Germany, quantification of the impact of universal banking relationships 
is in order. This paper presents new evidence on the role of the German universal banks 
during the period of heavy industrialization in the decade preceding World War I. By 
investigating the influence of universal banking relationships on the investment patterns 
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of industrial firms , this paper measures one component of the hypothesized impact of 
bank-based financial systems on industrial growth.  In contrast to several recent studies 
on the relative financing constraints of bank-attached and independent firms , this paper 
demonstrates that bank attachment is not associated with dramatic reductions in firms' 
liquidity sensitivity of investment . Thus, the findings suggest that the early work of 
economic historians and the recent work of economists may overstate the importance of 
relationship banking, particularly in the realm of industrial investment . 
The theoretical literature on the role of financial intermediation extends back at least 
to Gurley and Shaw ( 1960) , Brainard and Tobin (1961 ) ,  and Tobin ( 1969) ; yet this early 
work provided no comparison of financial institutions and their welfare implications . 
Recent work has offered both analytical models and qualitative descriptions of financial 
relationships, but there has been no definitive answer to the question of optimal financial 
structure . 3 
Most recent theories of financial intermediation , and of relationship banking in par­
ticular , are implicitly prefaced by the assumption that asymmetric information between 
investors and savers leads to capital market failures : excessively-risky uses of outside 
funds or dishonest reporting of project returns, for example. In order to avoid these 
moral hazard problems , investors may need to monitor the activities of entrepreneurs . 
If oversight is costly, and equally so to all investors , lack of an incentive for individ­
uals to share information creates an economy-wide duplication of effort . Selecting one 
investor to monitor for all economizes on investment costs and provides static efficiency 
gains. This process shifts the information gap from the entrepreneur and financier to 
the financier and depositors . In Diamond's ( 1984) framework, one investor collects funds 
from all others and then lends to many different firms , whose activities the delegated 
monitor observes closely. Diversification by the intermediary insures payment of the 
risk-free rate to depositors .4 
Diamond's delegated monitoring framework focuses on the static problem of monitor­
ing, but it may also be the case that corporate financiers experience dynamic economies 
of scale that give certain investors advantages over others . 5 That is, information about 
investing and investment targets accrues over time . Efficiency improvements may result 
from cost reductions in funds provision itself and from refinements in the information 
investors obtain about specific entrepreneurs and projects .  Through both channels , the 
financier will encounter progressively lower costs . Those who are willing and able to 
invest early will earn rents :  they will gain a cost advantage over late-comers and will sell 
their accumulated information in the form of deposits . 6 These financial intermediaries 
will be able to guarantee lower-risk rates of return than would be available to individu­
als , and depositors will pay for this in the form of relatively low interest rates on their 
deposits .  
The link between theoretical models of financial intermediation and empirical stud­
ies of the importance of banking relationships is indirect and is based on the predic­
tions of several models concerning incompleteness of contracts (Greenwald , Stiglitz and 
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Weiss (1984) , Grossman and Hart (1982) , Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Myers and Ma­
j luf (1 984) , Stiglitz and Weiss (1981 ) , and Stultz (1990) to name a few) . These models 
connect failures in the capital markets (information and incentive problems stemming 
from separation of ownership and control) to the relative costliness of external finance. 
If banks act as monitors , they will have better information about their clients '  invest­
ment opportunities than would individual investors . Others have argued that , because 
of this attenuation of asymmetric information problems, a firm's investment will depend 
on the existence of new projects and not on the availability of internal funds . This same 
asymmetric information problem will cause un-monitored firms-who cannot defend the 
viability of each project to individual investors-to time investments according to their 
liquidity. According to this logic, investment should , therefore , be more sensitive to 
internal funds for unattached firms ' than for attached firms . 
Previous work on the impact of close banking relationships or industrial group mem­
bership has compared liquidity sensitivities of investment to quantify the benefits of 
monitored corporate finance . Of greatest relevance to German-style universal banking 
are the studies by Hoshi , Kashyap , and Scharfstein (1991)  on post-war Japanese indus­
trial groups ; Becht and Ramirez (1993) on pre-World War I German mining firms ; Elston 
(1994) on modern German industrial firms ; and Ramirez (1995) on J .P. Morgan's group 
in the United States at the beginning of this century. These authors have tested the 
empirical disparity in the investment-liquidity relationship according to a priori assump­
tions about the difference in information problems faced by individual firms . 7 All of 
these studies have found higher cash-fl.ow sensitivity for the group of firms considered 
to be unattached to a bank than for firms with bank connections, and this has been 
taken as evidence of the important role of relationship banking in reducing information 
asymmetries between investors and savers . 
A major problem with comparing the behavior of attached and independent firms is 
that attachment to a bank may be endogenous . In particular , it may be inappropriate to 
assign a causal relationship between bank attachment and diminished liquidity sensitivity 
of investment . The causation may, in fact , run in the opposite direction or the two events 
may be simultaneous determined by a third factor. While some previous studies have 
attempted to address selectivity bias on the basis of qualitative arguments or simple 
comparisons of sample means , none has attempted to model selectivity bias directly. 
This study takes some steps toward accounting for such problems by linking discrete 
choice analysis of the characteristics of bank-attached firms to the disturbance terms in 
the random effects OLS model of investment . 
Diminished liquidity constraints for bank-attached firms may be consistent with the 
delegated monitoring theory, yet it does not reject dynamic theories : the two are not 
mutually exclusive . Distinguishing between static and dynamic effects requires some re­
finement of the standard liquidity constraints specification . Since the dynamic economies 
hypothesis implies an intertemporal efficiency gain it suggests that effects of bank rela­
tionships will become more pronounced with time . Attached firms ' liquidity sensitivity 
of investment , while perhaps equal to that of independent firms in the short run , should 
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be lowered in the long run . By including measures of the length of the bank-firm rela­
tionship, the dynamic effects of bank involvement can be tested. Another possibility is 
to study the investment sensitivity of newly-public firms . If, for example , IPO firms with 
bank attachments are equally liquidity constrained as those without bank involvement , 
then it will be difficult to support the static delegated monitoring theory. 8 
While delegated monitoring and dynamic economies of scale may simultaneously de­
scribe different characteristics of the same financial system, they seem to imply funda­
mentally different ways of selecting bank clientele . In Diamond's original formulation of 
delegated monitoring, the problem of who monitors the monitor is dealt with through 
diversification by the intermediary. This construction implies that optimal financial inter­
mediaries should be infinitely large and perfectly diversified . Under dynamic economies of 
scale , however, the greatest rents may accrue to intermediaries that specialize in particu­
lar sectors . That is, much of the information relevant to financing investment is industry 
specific and may relate to specialized technology or even the industrial organization of 
the sector. 9 Thus, the degree to which financial intermediaries focus their involvement 
provides a measure of the extent to which learning is important in the dynamic finance 
production function . In the German case , large , universal banks appear to have been 
highly specialized. Such lack of diversification hints at gains from specialization that 
may only be reaped over the course of the banking relationship . Patterns of interlocking 
directorates are discussed further in the final section .10 
A simple test of the sensitivity of investment to internal funds may not fully cap­
ture the effects of liquidity constraints faced by industrial firms. Indeed, according to 
the recent work of Kaplan and Zingales ( 1996) , liquidity sensitivity of investment may 
bear no consistent relationship to financing constraints. Another approach is to investi­
gate the temporal distribution of investment . If investment is concentrated in one year 
rather than being dispersed throughout the period ,  there may be evidence of liquidity 
constraints .11 Uneven investment patterns alone, however, do not provide evidence 
of financing constraints .  Investment may appear to be clumpy either because of the 
lumpiness of demand for fixed capital (for example , when a new factory or mine shaft 
is built ) or because of the need on the part of the firm to accumulate internal funds 
even for smaller investments .  In the former case , lumpy investment may cause real or 
apparent financing constraints ,  while in the latter case liquidity constraints cause lumpy 
investment . Sectors that naturally invest in a lumpy manner may exhibit particularly 
high liquidity sensitivity of investment . Thus, a certain amount of qualitative informa­
tion , including the industrial branch of the firms , is helpful in gauging the relevance of 
liquidity sensitivity for financing constraints. 
The analysis in this paper begins by testing the hypothesis that close involvement 
with a universal bank diminishes a firm's liquidity sensitivity of investment and that this 
effect is intensified over time . The paper continues by investigating the effects of possible 
selectivity biases among firms involved in financial and industrial networks . The last 
part of the paper investigates directly the characteristics of firms involved in interlocking 
directorates. The results show that evidence on the existence and relaxation of liquidity 
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constraints varies with the type of firms under investigation . In some cases , bank-attached 
firms experienced higher liquidity sensitivity than unattached firms , but this relationship 
was mostly diminished for older than average attached firms . A more direct measure of 
long-term relationships-the existence of attachment in the five years prior to the period 
investigated-yields weaker results. This study thus emphasizes the dynamic nature of 
learning in financial intermediation, and it argues for a more conservative interpretation of 
the role of relationship banking in economic growth and industrial development than that 
which has been advocated by previous researchers . From a methodological standpoint , 
this study also suggests that measurement of firms ' liquidity sensitivity of investment 
may provide misleading predictions about financing constraints. 
I. Institutional Background 
Universal banks are thought of as those financial institutions that concurrently provide 
several types of financial services-including short-term commercial banking, long-term 
investment functions , and brokerage services. In this study, the terms credit banks , 
universal banks , and mixed banks are used interchangeably and all refer to the group of 
German joint-stock banks that provided a variety of financial services to industry at the 
turn of the last century. The nine largest of the universal banks became known as the 
great banks .12 For the purposes of this study, all other joint-stock universal banks are 
categorized as small (or provincial) banks . 
A.  Universal Banking in the German Context 
The functions performed by the German credit banks extended to many realms 
of corporate finance and continued to evolve over time .13 Their credit operations­
including several types of short-term credits and loans, payment services , brokerage, and 
underwriting-set the German universal banks apart from other financial institutions . The 
consensus in the historical literature indicates that the universal banks offered industrial 
credit primarily on a short-term, but flexible , basis and often ended up financing the 
accumulation of fixed capital . Commercial services included facilities for making and re­
ceiving payments ,  undersigning of commercial paper , Giro accounts (payments made and 
received between customers of one bank) , foreign bills of exchange , current account cred­
its ,  discounting of bills and outstanding business accounts ,  and information on business 
connections (including individuals , firms , and foreign markets) . 
German j oint-stock companies used mainly banks as financial intermediaries , rather 
than raising funds directly from the public . The universal banks were actively involved 
in transformations and foundings , issuing of industrial securities , syndications and secu­
rities holding. Indeed, the post- 1870 boom in joint-stock foundings is thought to have 
been a direct result of the banks ' activities , with a majority of new companies being 
organized by the banks .14 The large credit banks were also responsible for many other 
new issues of corporate securities , particularly in the mining, machinery, and electrical 
industries . For underwriting large or risky projects-such as loans to the Prussian army­
banks often combined into syndicates , allowing the banks to offer large amounts of credit 
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while safeguarding against over-exposure to risk. 
As a result of many of their promotional operations, the banks often held-both volun­
tarily and otherwise-the securities of their client firms , thereby providing further sources 
of liquidity. Banks were able to undertake the large investments they did because of 
their sizeable paid-in capitals as well as their close links to the capital market . Some 
might argue that the universal banks internalized the capital market , since their active 
role in the promotion and placement of securities apparently reduced the importance of 
the stock exchange for channeling capital into industry.15 The German capital market 
remains underdeveloped relative to its modern counterparts-particularly in Britain and 
the United States . 
B .  Quantifying Bank-Firm Relationships 
German corporate governance forms, which differ significantly from the Anglo-American 
board of directors , have changed little over the last century. Joint-stock companies are 
governed by two separate bodies : the executive board ( Vorstand:) is made up of firm 
managers , while the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) is comprised of shareholders ' rep­
resentatives. At the turn of the last century, members of the supervisory board did not 
play an active role in firms ' day-to-day operations , but they are thought to have wielded 
considerable influence in long-run investment and strategic planning. In addition to di­
rect power through voting rights, positions on firms ' boards are thought to have allowed 
banks access to the inner workings of the firms they financed and apparently functioned 
as a commitment mechanism between the two entities . 
The placement of bank directors on firms ' boards of directors is commonly perceived 
to have been the most powerful expression of a firm-bank relationship , and the insti­
tution of interlocking directorates has become a trademark of German-style universal 
banking. In 1905 ,  Otto Jeidels maintained that " . . .  the power of the Great Banks is ex­
ercised via the legal institution of the Aufsichtsrat , rather than through direct influence 
of financial strength." 16 In his influential 1962 treatment of European industrialization , 
Alexander Gerschenkron echoed Jeidel 's claim, saying that " . . .  through development of 
the institution of the supervisory boards to the position of most powerful organs within 
corporate organizations , the banks acquired a formidable degree of ascendancy over in­
dustrial enterprises , which extended far beyond the sphere of financial control into that 
of entrepreneurial and managerial decisions . "  17 
The means by which banks or firms could have initiated interlocking directorates were 
varied . The bank may have obtained proxy votes from depositors or may have ended 
up holding shares from new industrial promotions or bailouts of troubled firms. Alter­
natively, firms may have pursued bankers as board members for reputational reasons, 
or the two (or more) parties could have swapped shares and engaged in communities 
of interest . Equity ownership, it should be noted , was not a prerequisite for member­
ship in the supervisory board. Unfortunately, since firms were not required to report 
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lists of shareholders or their holdings (in the pre-war period) , no comprehensive data on 
ownership structure exists .  
Bank involvement with an industrial firm normally began with the extension by the 
bank of current account privileges and progressed from the granting of various other 
forms of credit ultimately to the underwriting, and often holding, of the firm's  securi­
ties . The range of universal banking operations suggests two additional ways to identify 
involvement between a bank and an industrial firm: the extension of current account 
privileges to the firm and the holding of the firm's securities . 
A current account with a credit bank provided a firm with many services and oppor­
tunities for short-term credit and often led to the provision of other services .  The current 
account may have also provided the bank with a window into the financial status of its 
client firms . A stronger link might be inferred if there we:re evidence that a bank issued 
or held substantial quantities of a firm's securities . The banks ' active role in joint-stock 
company transformations and foundings often led to the issuing of stocks and bonds by 
the bank. Participation in the promotional process gave the banks' access to proprietary 
information about firms , and the inclusion of clients ' securities in the banks ' portfolios 
offered banks some measure of direct control . 
Yet the existence of a current account or involvement in securities issues fails to 
discriminate between firms that had only a loose bank connection and those with a 
close, ongoing one . Credit bank current accounts were widespread-particularly among 
j oint-stock companies-and the banks ' insight could easily be impaired if, as they often 
did , client firms held such accounts with more than one bank. Furthermore , a simple 
current account relationship would not have allowed monitoring of firms ' investment 
proj ects .  The relationship resulting from promotional activities was almost certainly 
closer than that suggested by a current account . Nonetheless , since any firm wishing to 
issue securities did so through a universal bank, the holding of firm securities by such 
banks was common and could easily have been transitory. 
Ideally, all three indicators of bank attachment-current accounts, securities issues 
and holdings , and interlocking directorates-could be used to measure gradations of bank 
involvement . Due to the paucity of firm-level data on current accounts and securities 
holdings , though, the investigation must be limited to interlocking directorates . While 
this criterion may overlook firms with weak or informal connections to a bank, it will 
not falsely categorize unattached firms as attached . Furthermore , since the three types 
of interaction normally occurred as steps towards increased involvement , it is likely that 
firms involved in bank networks had already progressed through the current account and 
securities issue stages . Whether or not the bank successfully exerted influence through 
firms ' boards of directors remains to be determined, but the presence of bank represen­
tatives on company directorates still offers the strongest quantifiable evidence of bank 
connections. Identification of interlocking directorates for the firms studied in this paper 
is discussed in the next section . 
II. Data 
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A.  Sources 
The data for this study were compiled from Part II of Saling 's Borsen-Jahrbuch, a 
stock market annual that began publishing in 1876 and was targeted toward bankers 
and investors . Saling 's Part II contains entries on joint-stock companies traded at the 
Berlin stock exchange and includes balance sheet summaries , profit and loss statements, 
listings of supervisory and executive board members , as well as share capital history, 
ratios of market-to-par value of shares , and dividends. While Saling 's provides little 
discussion of underlying sources , the data appear to derive from the annual reports 
( Jahresberichte) of the firms . Since firms without stock market listings are excluded, 
samples taken from Saling 's are almost certainly biased toward larger, more established 
firms . Such firms , however, comprise the major clientele of the universal banks .18 One 
other limitation of the data-namely, the concentration on firms with the joint-stock form­
-should be recognized. While many firms converted to the joint-stock form in the early 
years of the twentieth century, a large portion of industrial firms maintained limited 
liability partnership ( G .m.  b .H . ) or private status . The bias toward larger firms appears 
to be more pronounced prior to 1 900,  when the average size of newly-listed firms was 
significantly larger than in ensuing years .19 In any case, since j oint-stock companies 
were the only class of firm required to publish an annual report , balance sheet data are 
only widely available for these firms . 
The data sample in this paper comprises 75 firms of two basic types-long-lived firms 
and newly-public firms . The first group includes 50 firms covering the period 1903 to 1913 .  
Selection , with one exception , was limited to  those firms in  continuous existence from 
1880 to 1913 .  Given these constraints ,  there is no entry or exit into or out of the sample, 
and thus , the panel is nearly balanced . Exceptions arise when variables are missing for a 
given firm-year, but these cases are rare . The long-lived firms were chosen and the firms ' 
:financial data was collected by Rudi Rettig.20 The data were sampled from the 1900 
volume of Saling 's and reflect the sectoral distribution of joint-stock companies reported 
there . The sample was also structured to represent size and geographical variation of 
reported (Berlin-listed) firms . The long-lived firms are on average 2 to 4 times larger 
than corresponding sectoral means for all joint-stock firms , but this discrepancy stems 
largely from the selection bias toward larger firms in the data source . 
Because of the constraints imposed on the selection of long-lived firms, I augmented 
the data with a random sample of newly-public firms . This group is comprised of a panel 
of 25 firms whose initial public offerings (IPO's) fell between 1880 and 1899 .  Like the 
first group of firms , the new firms were selected from those with entries published in the 
1 900 issue of Saling 's . Since firms were permitted to exit the sample at any time after 
the sampling date, the resulting panel is somewhat unbalanced . The IPO firms represent 
a random cross-section of j oint-stock firms founded between 1880 and 1900 that were 
listed in Berlin in 1900.21 
Some IPO firms may have operated under alternate corporate forms before becoming 
j oint-stock companies. Such firms were eliminated from consideration to the extent that 
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they were identifiable , however, the source is unclear in most cases.22 Nonetheless , 
transformation into the j oint-stock form was often associated with an increase in capital 
and other significant changes in operations, and thus can be seen as the beginning of a 
new stage in the life of the firm. It is, therefore , plausible that IPO firms would have 
experienced greater difficulty in obtaining finance than established j oint-stock firms, even 
with prior existence under alternative corporate forms. T 
he two groups of firms complement one another by providing a comparison of effects 
during early and later stages of the firm's development. Because of widely varying criteria, 
the samples are quite distinct from one another . The descriptive statistics presented at 
the end of this section summarize the differences between the samples for a range of 
variables. Since the samples appear to derive from fundamentally different populations , 
the analysis is performed separately for the two panels, though the results are compared 
at several stages. 
B. Measuring Interlocking Directorates 
Categorizing industrial firms as attached or unattached to a universal bank is more 
complicated in practice than in theory. There are four ways in which a firm might be 
considered to have interlocking directorates with a bank: executive board to executive 
board, executive board to supervisory board (either bank to firm or firm to bank) , or 
supervisory board to supervisory board. Since the executive board is comprised of firm 
managers , presence in that body denotes a degree of day-to-day involvement not indicated 
by membership in the supervisory board. Thus, attempting to narrow the investigation to 
bank representation at firms would suggest looking for members of a bank executive board 
sitting concurrently on a firm's supervisory board. Such a restriction, however, eliminates 
firms whose supervisory boards were interlocked with a bank's-a potentially important 
conduit for information and oversight. Since I am interested in information flows between 
the bank and firm, and since the importance and power of the supervisory and executive 
boards varied from firm to firm, I include all possible conduits of j oint membership in 
my measure of interlocking directorates. 23 It seems preferable to include some firms 
in the attached category whose bank relationships were weak than to include firms with 
strong bank connections in the unattached category. The former, at least , would bias the 
results against finding significant differences between attached and independent firms. 
While it might be desirable to establish whether an individual found on multiple 
supervisory boards was a representative from the bank to the firm or vice versa, it is 
difficult to make such a distinction due to the equivalent stature of j ointly-held positions . 
Furthermore , since few of the concurrent supervisory board members in the current 
samples were also members of the sampled firms' executive boards, the problem remains. 
The chair and vice-chair of the supervisory board are indicated in Saling 's, but it is not 
clear that these positions indicate primary allegiance either. 
The data source , since it contains information on firms listed at the Berlin stock 
exchange , includes entries on all of the principal universal banks as well as many of 
9 
the smaller joint-stock credit banks . The firm reports include a listing of executive and 
supervisory board members , and from this , I compiled an alphabetical directory of all 
board members of all (Berlin-listed) universal banks . By cross-referencing the executive 
and supervisory board members of the firms in the samples with this bank board member 
directory, I determined which firms were engaged in interlocking directorates with a 
bank and what proportion of each firm board was interlocked (that is , the share of 
the firm's board members having seats on both a bank and firm board) . Four natural 
categories of bank attachment emerge : small (provincial)-bank only, great (berlin)-bank 
only, combination of small and great banks , and no bank. 
I checked for attachment in 1900, 1905,  and 1910  and assumed that attachment 
status in the intermediate years was the same as the endpoints .  In the cases in which the 
endpoints were different , I assumed that the status changed mid-way through the period .  
For example , although I assumed that board membership in 1905 indicated strong bank 
attachment as early as 1903,  I was not prepared to make more radical assumptions. A 
firm with no bank attachment in 1900,  but with several bank representatives in 1905 ,  
would therefore be categorized as unattached through 1902 ,  but attached after 1902 .  
Attachment was nearly constant between 1905 and 1910 ,  however, there was a distinct 
shift toward attachment between 1900 and 1905 .  Since the purpose of this study is to 
evaluate the possible benefits from membership in a banking network, the analysis is 
constrained to 1903- 1913-the period in which bank-firm relationships stabilized.24 
C .  Descriptive Statistics 
The firms' financial variables are defined as follows : fixed capital includes land, prop­
erty, plant , equipment , patents, and permits (for example, the right to open a new mine 
shaft ) and excludes inventories (since inventories are likely to decline when production 
increases) ; investment is the first difference of gross fixed capital ; short-term liquidity 
is the sum of assets available on short notice , such as cash , notes , bank deposits ,  and 
accounts receivable; stock liquidity is the sum of short-term liquidity and longer-term 
financial wealth such as securities and participations in other firms ; revenues and profits 
are as reported in the profit and loss statements of the firms ; and inside finance (alter­
natively, net worth) is share capital plus reserves (in thousands of Marks) . Investment , 
liquidity, profits, and revenues are all normalized by the yearly stock of fixed capital .  
In nearly all cases it  i s  impossible to disaggregate long-term assets into finer gradations 
of liquidity. Thus , holding companies , to the extent that they existed in the first part of 
this century, are indistinguishable from subsidiaries or from bonds or other securities the 
firm may have held . Since all such financial investments are reported together for most 
of the firms, such aggregation is carried through for all firms in order to avoid measuring 
different quantities depending on reporting procedure . Such inconsistency underscores 
the reality that accounting practices were considerably less regulated in Germany in the 
pre-war period than they are today. Thus, balance sheet posts vary from firm to firm 
and from year to year . Since this paper focuses on comparing attached and independent 
firms , the biases introduced by over-aggregation of liquidity, for example , would have 
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to be systematically different for the various types of firms . In the current· sample, 
long-term securities and participations comprise a small portion of the stock of liquid 
assets ,  regardless of bank-attachment status . In addition , the correlation between short­
and long-term financial assets is very high and varies little (between 89 and 93 percent ) 
between categories of banking relationships .  
Tobin's q cannot be measured directly from the available data, since some components 
of the measure are not documented for the sampled firms . Saling 's does report the ratio 
of market to par value of common stocks (called the Kurs) , and this provides a proxy for 
marginal, common-equity q. 
Table IA compares sample means for the four sub-populations of firms : firms with 
attachment only to small banks, firms with attachment only to the great banks, firms 
with attachments to both great banks and other banks , and firms with no attachment to 
a bank.25 Data for IPO firms and long-lived firms are given separately, and t-test results 
for comparisons between sub-sample pairs are provided in Table IB . Since logit models of 
the characteristics correlated with the various types of bank attachment are analyzed in 
the final section of the paper, I discuss the sample means only briefly to warn of several 
significant differences among the sampled firms. As Table IB demonstrates, several means 
that appear to be different are insignificantly so due to high standard deviations . Means 
are calculated by firm-years , so that firms that change status mid-period fall into the 
appropriate categories in each year . In practice , since within-firm variation is smaller 
than between-firm variation , the time series component adds little information . 
Table IA here. 
Table IB here . 
Perhaps of greatest interest for this study is the similarity in investment rates among 
different categories of bank attachment and between IPO and long-lived firms. Indeed, 
only the difference of means between great-bank and combined-bank firms within the 
long-lived sample obtains statistical significance. Nonetheless, the large apparent differ­
ences in investment rates suggest variation in the distribution of normalized investment 
according to sub-group. The final section of the paper pursues this issue further . 
Fixed capital and net worth provide two measures of firm size, and Table IA reveals 
a striking difference in these variables between attached and independent firms as well as 
between IPO and long-lived firms . On average , long-lived, great-bank firms maintained 
over twice the net worth of their counterparts without great-bank connections , and firms 
with both great- and small-bank attachment had almost ten times the inside finance 
of unattached and small-bank-only firms . Similar relationships arise for fixed capital. 
Among IPO firms , firms with great-bank attachments are also the largest , however , the 
combined-bank firms tend to have less fixed capital than great-bank-only firms. Not 
surprisingly, the long-lived firms are larger overall by both measures. 
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Another obvious difference among types of firms is age , or more accurately, years 
from founding as a joint-stock firm. Naturally, given the sampling criterion, the greatest 
disparity lies between IPO and long-lived firms, however, there is also some variation 
within these subsets of firms . Unattached firms are youngest on average in both sam­
ples , though the difference obtains greater statistical significance among long-lived firms . 
Within the IPO sample , firms without bank attachment are of similar vintage as those 
with combined-bank attachments. 
Relative to their fixed capital , small-bank firms lie at the high end of the distribution 
for several measures of liquidity: short-term and total financial assets ,  revenues , and net 
profits .  This difference cannot be attributed to sectoral bias , since the sectors in which 
small-bank firms predominate-textiles and chemicals-show insignificant differences in 
average normalized short-term assets ,  revenues, and profits . Only the mean of total 
financial assets differs between these two sectors and all othern, and in this case the 
average is lower for textiles and chemicals than for other sectors . IPO firms as a group 
have higher (normalized) revenues and short-term liquid assets ,  yet they have profits and 
total financial assets on par with long-lived firms . 
Finally, the sample means and t-tests indicate that long-lived firms had substantially 
higher values of Tobin's q than IPO firms. Differences according to bank-attachment 
status within the two sub-populations are less pronounced, though they are significant in 
some cases . Among long-lived firms, for example, small-bank firms have a higher value of 
q than independents, while among IPO firms , the greatest split falls between firms with 
and without great-bank attachment (regardless of attachment to a smaller bank) . 
The descriptive statistics and significance tests indicate a variety of differences among 
the sample populations , but it is not immediately clear whether the variation in individual 
firm characteristics across categories provides a robust indicator of different types of bank 
attachment . It does warn of possible selectivity biases that should be ,  and are , accounted 
for in the econometric analysis that follows . 
III. Fixed Effects Specifications and Results 
Tobin's  Q theory of investment , and Hayashi 's (1982) interpretation thereof, provides 
the theoretical framework behind several recent empirical studies of firm investment 
behavior . In this framework, internal funds play no role in firms ' investment decisions ; 
only expected future profitability of investment enters consideration. Such models require 
strong assumptions . In particular , markets and firm competition must be perfect-two 
assumptions that are clearly violated for the present case . Liquidity constraints may, 
therefore, be a real problem, and this motivates the inclusion of inside funds in the 
investment regression equation. 
A. The Fixed Effects Model 
The empirical implementation of the Tobin's Q model encounters several difficul­
ties. Even in the case of modern data, Tobin's Q is notoriously difficult to measure .26 
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Dependence on stock market data may present a further complication in the German 
case. Since it is widely believed that the universal banks internalized the capital market 
through their distribution and brokerage networks , both par values and market values of 
shares could well be distorted. For example , the banks are thought to have propped up 
share prices occasionally, in order to unload their shares of issues they no longer wanted 
to hold. If this were the case , then the Kurs would give the false impression that the firm 
in question had particularly good future investment prospects .  Unfortunately, there is 
no practical solution to this problem at present , but the pervasiveness of such activities 
by the bank deserves further attention. 
Another potential ambiguity in the interpretation of inside funds in the investment 
equations arises from the possibility that liquidity proxies for production . High levels 
of production in one period may lead to the need for more capacity in the next period. 
To control for this potential accelerator effect, tagged production or production growth 
is often included among the exogenous variables despite the lack of strong theoretical 
motivation . Since production data is not generally available for my sample , I use revenue 
growth as the nearest alternative . The reduced form investment equation to be estimated 
is the following. 
(1 )  
Thus , I regress investment on lagged (beginning of period) investment (I) , stock liq­
uidity (SL) , revenue growth (Y) , and Tobin 's q (Q) ; indicator variables for attachment to 
a small bank, a great bank, and a combination of small and great banks (Bj) interacted 
with each exogenous variable ; and annual indicator variables (Tt)· Investment , stock 
liquidity, Tobin 's  q, and revenue growth are as previously defined, and all level variables 
are normalized by the firms ' yearly stock of fixed capital to reduce the possibility of 
heteroskedasticity and to control for size effects .  The interaction terms allow a compar­
ison of slopes between bank-attached and independent firms within the same regression 
equation . 27 
This basic specification is essentially the same as those used in other recent studies , 
though some adjustments have been made . The regression equation includes only the 
total stock of financial assets (at the beginning of each period) as the liquidity variable , 
because I consider it a more sensible representation of a firm's available finance than 
cash flow. In addition , since cash flow and stock liquidity are approximately 80 percent 
correlated in this sample, and since they are thought to measure similar financial char­
acteristics , inclusion of both variables creates the potential for collinearity problems. 28 
The introductory section suggested that dynamic economies of scale may yield signif­
icant reductions in the cost of external finance for firms that remain attached to the same 
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banks for several years . The data currently available permit no explicit measurement of 
the length of attachment to a particular bank. Since attachment status was checked for 
1900,  1905 ,  and 1910 ,  an alternative means of controlling for the length of attachment is 
to create an indicator variable for firms that were attached in the preceding period. The 
resulting long-term relationship indicator variable takes the value one for firms attached 
as of 1 900 and zero otherwise . The interaction of this variable with the other exogenous 
variables permits a comparison between firms that were attached in 1900 as well as in 
1905 and 1910  and firms that gained bank attachments in 1905 or 1910  (or not at all) . 
A third specification incorporates the effects of age . In place of the LTR variable , 
this specification adds an indicator variable for whether the firm was older than average 
and interacts this variable with liquidity and each of the bank-attachment indicator 
variables . This is a second, broader attempt to capture the dynamic effects of bank­
firm relationships . Though this is certainly an imperfect indicator of the tenure of the 
banking relationship , age may play an important role in financing constraints .  Older 
firms might be expected, on average , to have easier access to external capital than young 
firms , and should, therefore , exhibit less sensitivity to liquidity. That is , firms that are 
both attached and relatively far along in their life cycles should be the least liquidity 
constrained. It is interesting to investigate whether an age effect exists in general, and 
whether bank attachment has any effect on the process . The age test is less useful for the 
IPO firms, since all the firms were selected to be young, and thus the life spans captured 
in that sub-sample are much shorter. Nonetheless, since the IPO firms are younger than 
the long-lived firms they already provide some insight into the age question . Thus , the 
first specification is repeated for the full sample , and an indicator variable for IPO status 
(and the interaction of this variable with the other exogenous variables) is included . 
The panel structure of the data leads to regression equations of the form Yit = Xit/3 + 
Eit, for i = 1 ,  2 ,  ... N and t = 1 ,  2 ,  ... Ti, where Eit = ai + 'T/it· This specification allows 
insights into the dynamics of firm investment , but in doing so, it introduces the possibility 
of correlation over time . Accordingly, I make the standard panel assumptions about the 
error distributions: 1 .  the expected values of the error components ( ai and 'T/it) are 
zero ; 2 .  the components are uncorrelated (E(ai'T/it) = O) ; 3. the firm-specific errors are 
uncorrelated ( E( EitEjt) = 0, i =/= j) ; 4. There is no serial correlation within individual 
cases ' error terms (E(TJit'T/it') = 0, t =!= t'); 5 .  'f/it is i . i .d. within groups ; and 6. ai is i.i .d .  
To estimate the investment equations just described, I first use the standard within 
groups (fixed effects) method and then, in the next section , employ a generalized least 
squares (random effects) framework. The within groups estimation runs OLS on the 
variables minus their time averages and is equivalent to a pooled regression in which 
indicator variables are included for each cross-sectional unit (firms, in the current case) . 
A major concern in estimating the differences in liquidity sensitivity of investment 
according to bank-attachment status is that there is endogeneity in the right hand side 
variables . In particular , selectivity bias in the choice of bank attachments may drive the 
apparent differences in coefficient estimates: characteristics that cause firms to become 
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involved with banks may simultaneously lead to diminished liquidity sensitivity. 29 Since 
it is constant across time , the error component sensitive to endogeneity, ai, is removed in 
the case of the within groups estimator. If biases arise at the firm level, the fixed effects 
model ameliorates the selectivity problem. Direct tests of selectivity bias are provided in 
the following section. 
B. Results 
Table II gives the results for the first two of the three investment equation specifica­
tions just described. The first two columns include only long-lived firms , whereas , the 
second two cover all firms . Columns one and three include only the variables of the base 
specification-that is lagged investment , stock liquidity, revenue growth, and Tobin' s  q, 
along with the interaction terms for the various, bank-attachment categories and annual 
indicator variables . 30 
The coefficient on stock liquidity in column one is negative but insignificantly different 
from zero , and thus, on average there is little liquidity sensitivity of investment among the 
long-lived firms as a group. In contrast , the coefficients on the interaction of liquidity with 
bank-attachment indicators are positive and significant-suggesting a strong relationship 
between investment and internal funds for bank-attached firms . The baseline coefficient 
on the Tobin's q proxy is positive and significant (in contrast to that on liquidity) , yet-as 
evidenced by the significant negative estimates on the interaction of bank indicators with 
q-the corresponding coefficients for the bank-attached firms are positive but significantly 
lower. Together , then , the estimates indicate that unattached firms ' investment responds 
to expected future profitability, while attached firms' investment moves with internal 
funds . 
This finding contrasts with those of the majority of recent studies and suggests, on 
the face of it , that close involvement with a bank yields no easing of liquidity constraints .  
Hoshi , Kashyap , and Scharfstein (1991) on modern Japan and Ramirez ( 1995) on J .P. 
Morgan at the turn of the last century, for example , find that bank-attached firms enjoyed 
substantially lower liquidity sensitivity than their unattached counterparts .31 Assum­
ing previous studies have correctly estimated relative liquidity sensitivities, the current 
results show, at a minimum, that the effects of bank attachment are not generalizable . 
Implicitly, however ,  Ramirez ( 1995) lends .support to the findings in this paper. Since 
Ramirez compares J .P. Morgan firms to all others , and since several other investment 
and commercial banks engaged in similar practices to the German universal banks , there 
must be firms in the unattached category that had attachments to banks other than 
Morgan's .  Since the Morgan firms nonetheless demonstrate lower liquidity sensitivity 
than these other bank-attached firms , clearly the majority of bank-attached firms did , 
on average , show sensitivity to their inside funds . It would be necessary to identify and 
measure liquidity sensitivity for the sub-sample of non-Morgan firms in order to compare 
the results of Ramirez's investment regressions to those in this study. 
The results of the Hoshi , Kashyap, and Scharfstein ( 1991 )  study may also be inap-
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propriate as a comparison to the current case . While group membership was assumed 
to be exogenous in that study, it may not have been . Since many of the bank-attached 
firms they studied subsequently freed themselves of group ties (see Hoshi , Kashyap, and 
Scharfstein (1993) ) ,  clearly the group-attached category contained a large proportion 
of financially secure firms . Furthermore , even though group membership was stable 
throughout the period of their investigation , it must have arisen at some point . At that 
point , certainly the attachment process was, if not systematic , at least not completely 
random.  While it may be unable to explain the liquidity sensitivity results in their earlier 
paper, a discrete choice analysis of the characteristics correlated with group membership 
would aid in understanding the differences in the process of formation of industrial groups 
in Germany and Japan. 
Table II here . 
The specification in column two of Table II adds the previously-described indicator 
variable for attachment in the previous period (LTR) as well as the interaction of LTR 
with liquidity. Coefficients on the interaction of these variables with liquidity are negative 
as expected, but they are statistically insignificant . This is likely due to the small number 
of firms fitting the criterion and suggests that further work on long-term relationships 
is warranted. For example , the sample might be extended to later years in order to 
capture more firms with long-term relationships with banks . The inclusion of the LTR 
variables causes little movement in the coefficient estimates on the variables from the 
original specification . 
Columns three and four of Table II repeat the first two specifications for the full sample 
and include an indicator variable for membership in the IPO sub-sample. Coefficients on 
the IPO indicator variables, and the interaction of these variables with stock liquidity, 
suggest qualitatively similar results as those for long-lived firms taken separately. When 
the indicator for long-term relationships is included, along with its interaction with stock 
liquidity (column four) , the baseline coefficients are nearly unchanged. The coefficient 
on stock liquidity for great-bank firms , however, leaps to over nine , and that on liquidity 
for great-bank firms with long-term relationships turns nearly as large and negative . 
These estimates of liquidity sensitivity suggest that , on average , firms with great-bank 
attachment increased investment by nine units for every additional unit of financial assets ,  
but that those firms that had been attached to a great bank continuously in the five 
years preceding the period in question enjoyed much lower sensitivity to their inside 
funds . While there is some intuitive appeal to the notion that banks attach to firms with 
naturally tighter liquidity constraints and that they are only able to ameliorate such 
problems after several years of involvement , the sheer size of the coefficient estimates is 
suspect . 
Closer inspection of the data reveals that such doubts are well-founded. Indeed, one 
IPO firm seems to drive the reported results ,  and the firm's financial situation provides 
a good example of the potential weaknesses of this methodology for measuring firms' 
liquidity constraints .  The firm in question , Rostocker Strassenbahn Aktiengesellschaft , 
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was a light rail company operating in Rostock. Having decided during the general meeting 
of shareholders in 1897 that they would undertake the electrification of the railway, the 
company spent six years negotiating the deal with the city in which they operated.32 In 
1 903,  the shareholders finalized the municipal contract and voted to raise 800,000 Marks 
to finance the project . Thus , the company raised its share capital from M. 370 ,500 to 
M .  670 , 500 and issued M. 500,000 in bonds . In addition, in the following year, the firm 
borrowed M. 261 , 033 from the electrical firm Lahmeyer & Co. in Hamburg. As a result 
of this investment , fixed capital rose from 371 to 1 , 196 thousand Marks between the close 
of 1 903 and the close of 1904. During the same period, revenues from its newly-electrified 
lines increased from 97 to 146 thousand Marks . Since the lines were only opened halfway 
through 1904, these returns are all the more remarkable . 
Through the early stages of these investment decisions, Rostocker Strassenbahn A .G .  
apparently had no  interlocking directorates with a bank.33 · By 1905 , the firm had inter­
locking directorates with one of the so-called great banks , but the top positions remained 
independent of bank involvement . Since the stock of liquid assets ,  or cash flow, was 
relatively small in the period preceding the surge in investment , the estimated regres­
sion line is extremely steep . Since this firm is categorized as attached to a great bank, 
the resulting high level of sensitivity is attributed to that category of firm. Further­
more , since the firm was without previous bank attachment , the coefficient on liquidity 
for bank-attached, LTR firms fully offsets that on liquidity for attached firms overall . 
Taken together , these effects present what may be misleading results .  Without similar 
investigation of the other firms, however, it is impossible to know how unusual this firm 
was . In the case of the light rail sector, it is more likely that it was the exceptional firm 
that did not undergo electrification in the decade or so around the turn of the twentieth 
century. Likewise , new technologies were developed and applied in many other sectors 
of the economy, and such firms would have also undertaken major investment projects .  
Other researchers have discarded firms with investment over certain limits ,  apparently 
for statistical reasons . On the contrary, it seems that these are exactly the firms that 
should be investigated the most closely.34 
The case of Rostocker Strassenbahn supports the point made in Kaplan and Zingales 
( 1996) that , in general , liquidity constraints and investment-cash flow sensitivities have 
no monotonic relationship to one another . In particular , this case points to certain con­
ditions under which the least constrained firms will appear to have the greatest liquidity 
sensitivity. For example , long delays between the decision to invest and the beginning 
of investment , due to protracted negotiations with the municipal government , create the 
appearance of liquidity constraints .  Such delays might occur in many situations , and the 
accumulation of internal funds might therefore be an accidental (or at least , unneeded) 
by-product of delays . In fact , Rostocker Strassenbahn did not accrue internal funds dur­
ing the six years of negotiations . This behavior only supports the notion that this firm 
was unconstrained, since it suggests confidence that the substantial new investment could 
be efficiently financed through outside funds . Cases in which internal funds reached rel­
atively high levels in the period before investment can actually produce lower estimates 
of liquidity sensitivity than cases in which internal funds do not accrue at a rapid rate. 
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It should be pointed out that relative to the IPO firms , the long-lived sample contains 
more firm-years , even controlling for sample size , in which investment exceeded the stock 
of fixed capital in the base year . Such firm-years also fall into one of the bank-attachment 
categories .  The absence of comparatively low cash flow or liquidity in these cases , how­
ever, means that none of these high-investment cases produces apparent outliers among 
the long-lived firms . Thus , the long-lived sample yields more moderate (and probably 
more generalizable) estimates of liquidity sensitivity for attached firms than does the IPO 
sample . 
Table III gives the results for the third specification, in which an indicator variable 
is included for older-than-average firms . Column one repeats the results for the original 
specification . Column two shows that , as in the base specification , the coefficients on 
liquidity interacted only with bank attachment dummies are positive . This suggests 
that younger-than-average attached firms experienced tighter liquidity constraints than 
similar unattached firms. Coefficients on the simultaneous interaction of liquidity with 
bank attachment and OLD are negative . These results indicate that firms that had 
great-bank or combined attachments and were older than average had lower liquidity 
sensitivity of investment than other great-bank firms , but they still had higher sensitivity 
than independent firms in all categories . This finding is qualitatively the same as those 
for the LTR variable presented in Table II, but the statistical power is now greater. 
Nonetheless , it is not clear that bank attachment lessened firms' liquidity sensitivity 
over time , since older firms should have experienced looser liquidity constraints than 
their younger counterparts .  Even the oldest of the attached firms had higher liquidity 
sensitivity than the unattached firms overall . 
Given the findings on liquidity sensitivity, there is good reason to question the role of 
bank attachment in firms ' liquidity sensitivity of investment . To the extent that banks 
eased financing constraints , they therefore seem to have yielded only small , long-term 
benefits .  
Table III here. 
A causal relationship cannot necessarily be inferred from the finding that only bank­
attached firms had positive liquidity sensitivity of investment . The findings heighten 
worries about selectivity bias , and thus the following two sections provide both a direct 
attempt to control for such influences as well as deeper analysis of the characteristics 
associated with bank-attachment . As I pointed out in the previous section, however , the 
fixed effects specification should mitigate selectivity problems , since it eliminates firm­
specific effects .  Nonetheless , if biases are systematically related to characteristics other 
than firm identity, then improvements may be possible . 
IV. The Random Effects Model with Selectivity C orrections 
In contrast to the fixed effects estimator described in the previous section, the random 
effects estimator runs OLS on a weighted value of the exogenous variables (X - 8X) .  The 
weight , theta, is based on the ratio of variances from the within and between (OLS on time 
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averages of the variables) groups estimators . In the case of a balanced panel, Hausman 
and Taylor ( 1981 )  show that GLS estimation is equivalent to a weighted average of these 
two estimators . When a panel is unbalanced , which is the case with the current data, 
there are two places where some adjustments may be necessary: the variance components 
( s; and s� ) and theta (directly via the variation in the number of time periods across 
cases and indirectly via the variance components) . If the panel is unbalanced, theta 
should be calculated separately for each case depending on the number of time periods 
available. 
Individual effects remain in the GLS random effects estimates. To control for poten­
tial selectivity bias in the random effects model , I use the method described by Dubin 
and McFadden ( 1984) , in which a Heckman-type selectivity correction term is included 
as an independent variable for all but one choice category. The first step is to run a logit 
regression on the multinomial choice variable for bank attachment . The errors calculated 
in the logit regressions are correlated with the firm-specific effects that are of concern 
in the investment regressions . Correction terms are then formed using the predicted 
probabilities from the logit estimates and are included as exogenous variables in the in­
vestment regressions . The coefficients on these selectivity terms measure the correlations 
between unobserved firm effects and unobserved factors that influence the probability of 
attachment . In the fixed effects regressions , the attached firms had significantly higher 
liquidity sensitivity than independent firms, yet this sensitivity may be related to other 
factors that tend to go hand in hand with attachment . Thus, if the logit equation can 
be specified to capture the major characteristics influencing the choice of interlocking 
directorates, the resulting selectivity terms will minimize the influence of these factors in 
the estimation of the investment equation . The logit results are reported in Table V in 
the following section, and the correction terms for the four-choice case are derived in the 
appendix. 
Table IV presents the results of the random effects procedure , and the four columns 
correspond to those in Table IL Changes arise in the estimation procedure, the addition 
of the selectivity correction terms , and the restriction of the sample in columns three and 
four to the IPO firms alone . 35 All of these changes can have effects on the coefficient 
estimates. The statistical tests at the bottom of Table IV reveal that the investment 
behavior of IPO firms is better described by the random effects model than the fixed 
effects model. On the other hand, the extremely low P-values for the Hausman Chi­
square test suggest that the fixed effects model better suits the case of the long-lived 
firms . Nonetheless , it is useful to examine the effects of the newly-introduced selectivity 
correction terms for both sub-samples . 
The selectivity correction terms are statistically significant in only about one third of 
the cases . Among long-lived firms , the combined-bank firms show a significant , negative a 
priori effect on investment , while great-bank-only firms exhibit a positive , and only weak, 
relationship . The results for the great-bank and combined-bank firms are essentially 
reversed in the IPO sample , though the negative coefficients on the great-bank-only 
correction term are substantially larger in absolute value than any of the other coefficients .  
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This effect is likely due to the same outlier discussed previously. In both sub-samples , it 
is the category that contains the largest firms that obtains negative coefficients on the 
corrections term. As is demonstrated in the next section, size is probably the strongest 
selection criterion for great-bank or combined-bank attachment . 
Among long-lived firms , the biggest effect on the coefficient estimates for liquidity de­
rives from the change to the random effects model . Exclusion of the selectivity correction 
terms produces almost no effect on the coefficient estimates or robustness tests .  Indeed, 
the coefficients on liquidity for all categories of bank attachment are actually higher when 
the corrections terms are included. This suggests that , if anything, the selectivity bias 
causes underestimation of liquidity sensitivity for attached firms . 
The correction terms do wield considerable statistical influence among the IPO firms . 
The exclusion of these terms yields more extreme estimates of liquidity sensitivity-in the 
positive direction for great-bank firms overall and in a negative direction for great-bank 
firms with long-term relationships . While this suggests that selectivity bias accounts for 
part of the extreme values of liquidity sensitivity of great-bank firms , the majority of 
the effect can still be attributed to the one outlier firm-year described in the previous 
section . In the absence of this outlier, the regression results for the IPO firms alone are 
statistically insignificant . Clearly, much of the poor statistical performance of the IPO 
sub-sample taken alone stems from the small number of observations , and this a problem 
that can only be addressed through expansion of the sample . 
Table IV here . 
V. Selectivity B ias : A Closer Look 
The random effects models just reported suggest that selectivity bias plays only a 
limited role in the findings on liquidity sensitivity. To the extent that the logit analysis 
fails to capture selection effects , however, the selectivity corrections in the random effects 
model will fail to fully account for such bias . Furthermore , the logit analysis may turn 
up systematic differences among the various types of firms that provide valuable insights 
into the process of interlocking directorates, but that cause little change in the estimation 
of firms' liquidity sensitivity. Thus, the first part of this section presents the results of 
the logit analysis used in forming the selectivity correction terms . 
The second part of this section examines the sectoral distribution of bank-firm in­
terlocking directorates . Such evidence provides further insight into the patterns of in­
terlocking directorates between banks and industrial firms in Germany. At the same 
time , the sectoral distribution of bank involvement also helps to distinguish between the 
dynamic economies of scale and static delegated monitoring frameworks of financial in­
termediation. The introductory section suggested that dynamic economies of scale favor 
specialization by financial intermediaries ,  while static delegated monitoring requires di­
versification to guarantee viability. The data reveal that specialization is clearly evident 
in the current case. 
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A.  Discrete Choice Analysis 
The GLS specification and selection correction model , though theoretically appealing, 
require several assumptions about the underlying properties of the data-some of which 
the current case likely violates. In particular , the power of the GLS-selectivity correction 
model hinges on the proper specification of the discrete choice model in the first step . To 
the extent that the first step fails to capture the effects of group selection bias , the random 
effects model retains selection bias . Since the descriptive statistics exposed several areas 
of potential divergence among the categories of firms , the logit analysis from the first 
step of the selection model are of particular interest . Table V gives the results of this 
procedure . The long-lived and IPO firms are treated separately, since they were shown 
in Tables IA and IB to have substantially different characteristics from one another. 
The dependent variable in the logit equation is the '!our-choice attachment variable 
that takes the value zero for no bank connection and one through three for small-, great­
' and combined-bank attachment , respectively. The independent variables include the variables involved in the investment equation-investment , stock liquidity, revenue growth,  
and Tobin 's marginal q-as well as a vector of control variables-fixed assets (to measure 
size) , age , capital intensity (the ratio of fixed capital to revenues) , leverage (the ratio of 
outside to inside finance) , profit margin (the ratio of profits to revenues) , and dividends 
(in the case of long-lived firms) . The capital intensity variable proxies for a capital-output 
ratio and uses revenues in the denominator due the lack of output data. The first three 
columns of Table V cover the long-lived firms , while the last three cover the IPO firms. 
Within each sub-sample, the columns give the results for small-bank, great-bank, and 
combined-bank attachment . 
Perhaps the most notable result is the lack of any systematic difference in the rates 
of investment among the various groups of firms . This confirms the findings of the 
ANOVA and t-tests given in Table IB . Like investment , revenue growth is statistically 
indistinguishable across bank-attachment categories . These two variables measure the 
rate of growth of a firm, and by either metric, bank-attached firms grew no faster than 
unattached firms . From the point of view of development and economic growth,  this 
finding casts some doubt on the importance of the banks for promoting industrialization 
through their involvement in industrial networks . 
Other variables do reveal significant differences between attached and independent 
firms , though the results are somewhat different for long-lived and IPO firms . For ex­
ample , among long-lived firms , bank-attached firms in general accumulated higher levels 
of stock liquidity (relative to fixed assets) than unattached firms . Whether this phe­
nomenon caused or was a reaction to bank attachment cannot be determined directly 
from the current data. There are logical explanations for either interpretation. Banks 
may have been attracted to firms with relatively strong financial positions for security 
reasons,  or bank-connected firms may have held higher levels of liquidity to maintain 
independence from bankers . 
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Among IPO firms, the pattern is different . Only small-bank firms held significantly 
higher levels of liquidity than unattached firms , and great-bank firms actually held lower 
levels . Much of the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficient on great-bank 
liquidity derives from the outlier firm discussed in the previous section .  When that firm 
is dropped from the sample, the coefficient rises to negative two, and the p-value of the t­
statistic falls to 17 percent . Combined-bank firms in the IPO sample held approximately 
the same level of liquid assets as unattached firms . The difference in liquidity coefficients 
between the IPO and long-lived firms suggests that liquidity was not a consistent criterion 
for forming interlocking directorates. 
Tobin 's marginal q provides a clearer indication of bank attachment . Regardless of 
bank type or firm age , this measure obtains positive coefficients .  These estimates are 
significant for great-bank and combined-bank firms in the long-lived sub-sample and are 
significant only for combined-bank firms in the IPO sub-"sample . The introductory section 
mentioned the possibility that Tobin 's q could easily be mismeasured due to the thinness 
of the capital market and the supposed influence of the universal banks in setting prices 
and par-values of securities . Such activities would have extended to unattached firms as 
well as attached, since the universal banks were virtually the only route to the capital 
market . The banks may have selected only the best-performing firms with which to 
engage in interlocking directorates ( ex ante monitoring in the sense of Aoki ( 1 995) ) , or, 
conversely, high values of q may have followed from the benefits of bank oversight and 
advice . It is also possible that the existence of interlocking directorates with a bank 
increased a firm's share price due to the signal it sent to the market (as in James ( 1987) ) .  
A s  with stock liquidity, without further data on the characteristics of firms before they 
engaged in interlocking directorates, it is difficult to assess causality. 
Age and size appear as two strong indicators of bank attachment . Among long-lived 
firms , the largest firms were most often attached to several banks , while the smallest 
firms tended to be attached to the provincial banks . Among IPO firms , great-bank 
attachment is also correlated with size . The coefficient on fixed assets is also positive 
for combined-bank firms, but the statistical relationship is weaker. Generally, then, it 
appears that only larger firms gained interlocking directorates with the largest banks. 
Such a result makes intuitive sense for two reasons . Only the largest banks would have 
been able to provide for the needs of extremely large firms , and only the largest firms 
would have yielded the high commissions that would be required for the profitability of 
large banks . Since firms with great-bank attachments were not growing particularly fast , 
it seems likely that the causality runs from size to attachment and not vice versa. 
Likewise , age is not a variable that can be caused by bank attachment , and it therefore 
offers interesting insight into the process of selecting firms for interlocking directorates .  
Among the long-lived firms , firms with more exclusive banking relationships-those with 
great-bank-only or small-bank-only attachment-were significantly older than unattached 
firms . Firms that were relatively old during this period are likely to have been fairly 
secure investments for the banks , but were also less likely to have required the kind of 
new, large-scale securities issues that likely resulted in board positions for a variety of 
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banks in the case of younger firms . Thus, among IPO firms , the youngest of the young 
tended to have the most bank connections. 
Attached firms appear to have had similar debt-equity ratios as unattached firms. 
Only small-bank firms in the IPO sample had statistically higher leverage , and in that 
case , the effect is small . Indeed, great-bank firms in the long-lived sub-sample had 
significantly lower leverage than unattached firms . These results may stem from the 
high inside liquidity and lack of particularly vibrant growth on the part of bank-attached 
firms . If a firm were not growing and investing at a high rate ,  and if internal liquidity 
were simultaneously relatively high , then there would be little call for issuing new debt . 
It may also have been the case that attached firms were not growing and investing at 
higher rates because bank attachments constrained their ability to do so-either directly 
through voting rights in the supervisory board, or indirectly through control of financing 
options.36 
Capital intensity provides less information about bank attachments than might be 
expected. The historical literature on Germany emphasizes the involvement of the large 
universal banks in heavy industry, and, as the next section shows , the current sample 
supports this view. Nonetheless , great-bank firms apparently had higher capital inten­
sity among the long-lived firms , but _ lower capital intensity among the IPO firms . In 
all other sub-populations the coefficients on capital intensity are small and statistically 
insignificant . One possibility is that revenues overstates output , and that this leads to 
underestimation of capital intensity. For this to lower disproportionately attached firms' 
capital intensity, however, revenues would have to exaggerate output to a greater extent 
for attached firms than for unattached firms . 
Profit margins seem to play a role only among long-lived firms-lending support to 
the notion that banks and firms formed relationships for a variety of reasons . Long­
lived firms with great-bank attachment , with or without additional connections , enjoyed 
substantially higher profit margins than all other firms . Given that IPO firms with 
similar connections did not experience similarly high margins , it seems likely that the 
causality runs from profitability to bank attachment . At a minimum, it is safe to say 
that bank-attachment caused no uniform improvement in profitability. Together with 
the data on liquidity, marginal q, and fixed capital , the profit margin findings paint a 
picture of successful ex ante monitoring by the large banks when it came to older firms. 
In the case of IPO firms , the fact that great-bank firms had higher q values despite 
their relative youth and, if anything, lower liquidity and profit margins , suggests that 
bankers may have wielded significant control over share prices for younger firms. Such 
influence is likely to have been direct (through manipulation of share prices) , but may 
have also resulted from the positive signal that bank attachment relayed to the capital 
market . While the latter explanation is more palatable from an economic standpoint , 
the historical literature lends more credence to the former.37 
Table V here. 
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Despite higher profitability among long-lived, great-bank firms, dividends appear to 
have been relatively low for these firms . At the same time, internal liquidity was shown 
to be significantly higher for these firms . Together , these :findings suggest that attached 
firms retained a relatively high share of their profits to hold in the form of :financial 
assets rather than distributing dividends . Without knowing the results of the investment 
regressions , this would seem like a surprising result , since it suggests that bank-attached 
firms were subject to greater liquidity constraints than were unattached firms . Indeed, 
Fazzari , Hubbard, and Petersen ( 1988) used low dividend payouts as their indicator of 
liquidity constraints .  The payment of lower dividends by attached firms only reinforces 
the finding that bank-attached firms ' investment was more sensitive to liquidity than was 
unattached firms'. 
Table Al in appendix B gives the results of the investment regression for long-lived 
firms when the sample is divided into low..; a:nd high-dividend groups . The specification is 
the same as the first specification in Table II, except for the sorting criterion .  The high­
dividend indicator variable takes the value one when dividends are higher than the median 
and zero otherwise . Thus , the specification is similar to that used in Fazzari , Hubbard, 
and Petersen ( 1988) . The coefficient on baseline stock liquidity is positive and strongly 
significant (0 .32) , while that on liquidity for high-dividend firms is significantly lower 
(0 . 13) . The overall significance and explanatory power of the regression are approximately 
the same as in the bank-sorted specifications. 
The logit analysis indicated that attached firms payed lower dividends on average than 
unattached firms , controlling for other characteristics. Nonetheless, bank-attached firms 
are no more likely to fall into the low-dividend category. Thus, the dividend sorting 
is not equivalent to bank-attachment sorting. This suggests that dividend policy is a 
distinct and equally good indicator of firms ' liquidity sensitivity as bank attachment . 
This finding might diminish the strength of the conclusion that bank-attached firms 
experienced greater liquidity sensitivity than independent firms . It is important , however, 
to recall that the selectivity correction terms for long-lived firms included the influence 
of the dividend variable as measured in the logit regression. For these firms, however, 
the selectivity correction terms caused no significant reduction in the liquidity sensitivity 
of bank-attached firms as estimated in the random effects model. Thus , these :findings 
bolster the contention that relationship banking caused no substantial improvement in 
firm's liquidity constraints .  
One variable that is omitted from the logit estimation deserves mention . Industrial 
sector likely played an important role in the formation of bank attachments. Indeed, cer­
tain sectors provide nearly perfect indication of bank attachment . Furthermore , sectoral 
identification is constant over time . From a statistical standpoint , therefore , sectoral 
indicator variables are inappropriate for estimating the logit equation .  In terms of mea­
suring selectivity bias , the underlying characteristics of firms in particular branches of 
industry are presumably more important than the sector itself. Thus, variables such 
as investment rates , revenue growth,  liquidity, profitability, and capital intensity should 
capture many of the important economic differences among sectors . Nonetheless , indus-
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trial branch remains an important component of the choice of bank attachment , and, 
therefore the next part of this section takes up that question directly. 
B .  Sectoral Distribution of Bank Attachments 
There are three reasons to investigate the sectoral distribution of bank attachments in 
the current sample . One motivation is historical . The historical literature emphasizes the 
concentration of large , universal banks on specific sectors of the economy.38 If this were 
not the case in the current sample , then further investigation would be required. Either 
the received wisdom would be faulty or the current data would be unrepresentative of 
the underlying population . As the following data show, the findings reject both of these 
scenarios . 
In addition , if bank-attached firms are unevenly distributed by sectoral affiliation , 
then the investment regression may capture sectoral effects rather than the influence of 
bank-attachment . While the results shown anything but a uniform distribution of bank 
networks , the findings suggest no clear direction of bias for the investment estimates . 
Finally, the sectoral distribution of bank involvement offers insight into the dynamic 
character of the production of financial services. The introductory section noted that 
dynamic economies of scale may lead to specialization by financial intermediaries , while 
static delegated monitoring favors diversification . While the two theories are closely 
related, they imply divergent outcomes in the structure of financing relationships. The 
makeup of bank clientele may have broader implications for financial stability in the 
economy at large . If specialization leads to greater fragility of the banking system, then 
the potential benefits of dynamic learning may be offset .39 
Table VI gives the sectoral breakdown of bank attachments in the current sample . 
The numbers in the table represent the percentage of firms in each sector that engaged 
in interlocking directorates with the given type of bank (including no bank) . The first 
four columns present the data for the long-lived firms , while the last four columns cover 
the IPO firms . The distributions are given for 1910 ,  though the shares changed only 
marginally throughout the period .  The percentages indicate that mining, electrical, and 
transportation firms were the most likely to have interlocking directorates with the largest 
of the universal banks . Furthermore , such firms were highly likely to involve themselves 
with multiple banks . Textile and chemical firms appear to have been mainly involved with 
the smaller, provincial banks , while firms in construction and food products (including 
beer) tended to be unattached . The sectoral breakdown, thus supports the traditional 
notion that the great banks concentrated their efforts in a small number of industries .40 
Table VII presents further evidence of the sectoral concentration by universal banks . 
The first column gives the average percentage of board seats that were held simulta­
neously by a bank board member. The second column presents the average number of 
banks represented on the firms' boards , while the third column calculates the percentage 
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of firms whose supervisory board chair or vice chair was held by a concurrent great-bank 
board member. The three columns are repeated for IPO firms . 
Again , electrical , mining, and transport firms rise to the top in the measures of the 
extent of bank involvement . Certainly part of the high rates of overlap and great-bank 
chair stems from the firms ' membership in bank boards . Nonetheless, the data indicate a 
high degree of networking among banks and these firms . In contrast , textile, construction , 
food product , and chemical firms generally fall at the lower end of the spectrum on these 
measures . Thus , bank attachment (particularly with great banks) was not only less 
frequent among these firms , it was also less extensive . 
Table VI here. 
Table VII here. 
Together, these pieces of evidence strongly support , and lend some quantification to, 
the commonly-perceived focus of the great banks. In addition, these data offer some in­
sight into the clientele of the less-researched provincial banks-showing that these banks 
serviced different sectors than those financed by the great banks . If securities holdings 
by the banks represented a subset of the firms with which they engaged in interlocking 
directorates , then the banks clearly held a minimally diversified portfolio . This finding 
therefore lends support to the dynamic economies of scale argument but suggests that 
overall financial stability may have been a problem. Indeed, the move toward concentra­
tion in the banking sector, the great part of which derived from the takeover of private 
and provincial banks by the great banks , may have been prompted by the desire for 
greater diversification following the economic crises of the early 1890's and 1900-01 . 
The banks clearly focused their attention on particular sectors , yet the findings here 
indicate no systematic manner in which bank effects might be proxying for sectoral 
effects .  First , the sectors that are most heavily bank involved, electrical, transport, and 
mining, are similar in industrial organization , but are quite different from one another 
in age and technological advancement (the types of factors that influence investment 
most significantly) . For example, all three sectors are oligopolistic : a small number of 
large firms dominate the industry, but an army of smaller firms fill smaller niches in 
the sector. Differences , however, may be more pronounced. The mining industry was 
one of the oldest and arose long before universal banking.41 The electrical branch, 
in contrast , arose in the early 1880's with the immediate involvement of the universal 
banks . Transportation falls somewhere in the middle , since it was an older sector of the 
economy but underwent significant technological advances relating to electrification . 
It might be reasonable to assume that bank-attachment status proxies for sectoral 
influences if none of the unattached firms belonged to the bank-dominated sectors, or 
if the largely-independent sectors could be expected to exhibit significantly different in­
vestment patterns than those with heavy bank involvement . Neither of these criteria 
seems to be fulfilled in the current data. First , one fifth to one third of mining companies 
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engaged in interlocking directorates with no bank or only with a provincial bank. Sec­
ond, metal and machinery companies were distributed fairly evenly across the banking 
spectrum. Third, chemical firms , many of which represented equally new and advanced 
technology as electrical firms, were largely without great-bank attachments. Finally, beer 
brewing, an industry that enjoyed substantial economies of scale , was a sector that was 
largely independent of bank involvement . Thus , greater parallels arise between attached 
and independent sectors than among the bank-networked sectors . There exists ,  at least , 
no clear direction of bias based on sectoral identification of bank-attached firms, and, 
therefore , the liquidity effects attributed to bank-attached firms seem warranted. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has presented new evidence on the operations of the German credit banks 
and their impact on industrial investment before World War I, while also offering insight 
into the role of relationship banking more generally. 
On the first count , the results indicate that German-style banks do not seem to have 
had large , static effects on firms ' liquidity constraints during the period of rapid economic 
growth before World War I. Bank relationships do , however, seem to have reduced firms ' 
liquidity sensitivity of investment over time in some cases. These conclusions are hardly 
those that would be expected, given the abundant qualitative literature on universal 
banks and their influence in the German industrialization . While a new story of the role 
of the universal banks does not f ully emerge from the current analysis , I can speculate 
on a couple of explanations for the contrarian findings . 
First , most investigations into the practices of German banks have been based on the 
experiences of a small number of high-profile firms-Siemens , Krupp , and Deutch-Lux, for 
example-and an elite group of industrialists and bankers-Stinnes , Rathenau , Hansemann, 
and others . 42 It is unclear how well their experiences generalize to the remainder of the 
population , and it is also undetermined how great an impact these special cases may have 
had on economy-wide aggregates . In addition , many accounts of bank-firm relationships 
arise out of post-World War I events . Industrial concentration accelerated during this 
period, and thus , bank influence concurrently became more apparent (if not more real) . 
It is erroneous to assume that banking and corporate governance relations during and 
after the first world war aptly describe the pre-war situation . 
Second, modern notions of the importance of universal banking have been heavily 
influenced by a small , and probably biased, body of literature . The historiographical lin­
eage can be traced back through Gerschenkron ( 1962) and Schumpeter ( 1 939) to Riesser 
( 1 9 10) . Jakob Riesser was a well- known Great Bank director, and his 1910  work was 
translated into English by the U .S .  National Monetary Commission in 191 1 .  Thus , his 
work has heavily influenced several generations of economists and historians-particularly 
in the United States . While his analysis is certainly accurate for a portion of German 
firms in particular sectors over a limited period of time, his conclusions may no longer 
hold when extrapolated, as they have been, to cover a wide assortment firms and indus­
tries since the middle of the nineteenth century. Furthermore , repeated quotation and 
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interpretation has tended to broaden and exaggerate Riesser 's original theses . 
The essence of both explanations is the same: past investigations have been narrow 
in scope ,  and their conclusions have been interpreted too generally. If the biases of past 
work are considered, the implications of this paper become less surprising or controversial . 
The second goal of this work has been to provide empirical evidence on more general 
questions of the importance of relationship formation on the part of financial interme­
diaries , and in this respect the results are mixed. Three general conclusions should be 
taken from this analysis . 
First , while the purpose of this work has not been to explain the phenomenon of 
interlocking directorates, the analysis here has revealed a need for such research in the 
future . Full comprehension of the nature of bank-firm attachments and their importance 
in industrial development may hinge on a clearer understanding of the process that 
creates these relationships . Thus far , work on banking relationships and firm liquidity 
sensitivity has neglected the subject of the process of attachment . The logit analysis and 
selectivity corrections in this paper represent a first step in providing some insight on 
the subject . Clearly, further research should grapple with the causality issue, and one 
way to do so would be to investigate the properties of firms before and after becoming 
involved in close banking relationships. 
Second, the analysis shows that the existence of high liquidity sensitivity provides an 
inconsistent measure of liquidity constraints . While the results for the long-lived firms 
appear to be free of outlier influence, the findings of extremely high liquidity sensitivity 
among great-bank attached, IPO firms clearly stemmed from the influence of one firm. 
The case study presented for that firm showed that this firm suffered from no apparent 
liquidity constraints, yet it had radically higher estimated liquidity sensitivity than other 
firms . These findings warn of the potential for misleading conclusions when liquidity 
sensitivity is assumed to measure liquidity constraints .  
Finally, if liquidity sensitivity does provide some indication of liquidity constraints , 
then the findings in this paper suggest that there is good reason to question the general 
ability of relationship banking to produce dramatic results .  The estimated differences 
in liquidity constraints for attached and unattached firms, for firms with and without 
long-term relationships , and, in the case of long-lived firms , for old, attached and young, 
attached firms provides evidence in favor of a dynamic economies of scale hypothesis and 
against a static interpretation of the viability of financial intermediaries. The demon­
strated specialization of universal banks in certain branches of industry further substan­
tiates such conclusions. These results undermine widely-held beliefs about the benefits 
of universal banking and also raise questions about the German banks' industrial policies 
and the extent and intimacy of their relations with firms. More generally, the findings in 
this paper contradict several recent papers that find that bank-attached firms encounter 
lower liquidity sensitivity of investment than do unattached firms. In addition , the spec­
ification that sorts firms by dividend payouts, reported in Table AI, finds analogous 
results to those in Fazzari , Hubbard, and Petersen ( 1988) . This finding only underscores 
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the limited effects of bank attachment , since bank attached firms appear in nearly equal 
numbers in the high-dividend and low-dividend categories . 
Clearly, further empirical studies of both the costs and benefits of universal banking 
are necessary. In the mean time-and until the potential costs are fully understood­
circumspection should be recommended in drawing policy conclusions in favor of increas­
ing relationship formation between banks and the firms they finance . 
29 
App endix 1 
The selectivity correction terms are derived according to Dubin and McFadden ( 1984) . 
The expected value of the disturbance conditional on a particular choice i having been 
made is 
E (� I i) = � ["V:R, ] [i �n;; + In P;l (2) 
where Ri is the correlation between TJ and Ei , m is the number of mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive choice alternatives , Pj is the multinomial logit estimate of the probability of 
choosing category j versus the base category, and Oj is an indicator variable that takes 
the value one if an individual chooses category j and zero otherwise. It follows that 
m L E [TJ I i] Di = i=l 
L
J.
m
=2 
[aV:Rj ] [ (Pj - Dj ) In Pj _ (P1 - 81 )  In Pi ] = t QjHj (3) 1 - Pj 1 - P1 i=2 
and Hi is the correction term. In the m-choice case , there will be m - 1 such terms of 
the following form: Hj = ( (Pj - Dj ) x log (pj ) / ( l  - Pi ) )  - ( (p1 - 81 )  x log (p1 ) / ( l  - p1 ) ) , 
for j = 2 ,  3 ,  . . .  , m.  
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Appendix 2 
Table AI here .  
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Endnotes 
1 See Baliga and Polak (1994) , Becht and Ramirez (1994) , Calomiris ( 1995 ) , Da Rin 
( 1994) , Elston ( 1995 ) , and Hoshi , Kashyap, and Scharfstein ( 1991 ) , for example . 
2 Schumpeter ( 1939) and Gerschenkron ( 1962) popularized general notions about 
the importance of universal banking in industrialization . Tilly ( 1965 ,  1991 ) espouses 
a more moderate view. Some recent research has challenged the traditional notion of 
German bank influence. See for example Neuberger and Stokes ( 1974) and Wellhoner 
( 1989) . 
3 See Baliga and Polak ( 1994) , Fischer ( 1990) , and Mayer ( 1988) ; or the review by 
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) . 
4 Diamond ( 1984) sets out the conditions for the viability of a financial intermediary. 
The model also implies that the optimal size of the intermediary is infinite .  Gale and 
Hellwig ( 1985 ) also develop a model of financial intermediation employing a debt contract 
framework with costly, ex post monitoring. 
5 Related theories are discussed in Rajan (1992) , Sharpe ( 1 990) , and von Thadden 
( 1990) . Gorton and Pennacchi ( 1990) , on the other hand, rationalize financial interme­
diaries as the providers of liquid securities or deposits for uninformed investors . The 
advantage of the intermediary over investors , in this case, is static. 
6 The actual duration of the advantage is an empirical question. 
7 This approach was suggested by Fazzari , Hubbard , and Petersen ( 1988) . See 
Chirinko ( 1995) , Gertler and Gilchrist ( 1994) , Houston and James (1996) , and Petersen 
and Rajan ( 1994) for related work. Fundamentally, these studies are based on a long­
standing literature on the determinants of industrial investment in general . See Kuh 
( 1963) , and Meyer and Kuh (1957) . 
8 See Fohlin ( 1994, 1996a) for more on IPO firms , especially in the case of Italy. 
9 Millon and Thakor ( 1985 ) eliminate the result of infinitely large intermediaries by 
assuming economies of scope from information reusability. The tradeoff between such 
economies and free riding problems within the intermediary permits imperfect diversifi­
cation and finite size. It does not suggest specialization . Other related theories include 
Chan , Greenbaum, and Thakor ( 1986) , employing a public goods framework, and Allen 
( 1990) , modeling an information broker . 
1 0  See Fohlin ( 1994, 1 996b (forthcoming) )  for further investigation of the sectoral 
breakdown of bank attachments and factors leading to involvement in banking and in­
dustrial networks . 
1 1  In a recent study of Columbian firms , Ospina (1994) demonstrates that smaller 
firms have particularly clumpy investment patterns , and this is seen as evidence that 
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1 1  In a recent study of Columbian firms , Ospina ( 1994) demonstrates that smaller 
firms have particularly clumpy investment patterns , and this is seen as evidence that 
lack of access to capital markets by such firms leads to tighter financing constraints than 
those faced by medium and large companies . 
1 2  These included Berliner Handelsgesellschaft , Bank fiir Handel und Industrie , 
Commerz- und Discontobank, Deutsche Bank, Discontogesellschaft , Dresdner Bank, Mit­
teldeutsche Credit bank, Nationalbank fiir Deutschland, and A. Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein . 
13  There is an enormous literature describing both debit and credit operations. 
See, for example , Bosenick ( 1912 ) , Buchwald (1909) , Jeidels (1905 ) , Motschmann ( 1915 ) , 
Riesser ( 1910 ,  1 1 ) , and Whale (1930) . 
14  Strenuous criticisms were launched at the credit banks during the ensuing de­
pression , with many blaming the banks for engaging in and fomenting stock-market 
speculation . For a range of polemics see Glagau ( 1876) , Lansburgh ( 1909) , and Sattler 
( 1890) . Even Riesser , a great-bank director, acknowledged some bank culpability. 
1 5  The banks ' near internalization of  the capital market may have stemmed from 
bourse taxes and membership regulations . The regulatory framework is beyond the scope 
of this paper but is a topic deserving of closer scrutiny. 
16  Jeidels ( 1905 ) , p .  145 ,  author's translation . 
1 7  Gerschenkron ( 1962 ) , p. 14 .  
18 See Fohlin ( 1995 ) for a lengthier discussion of Saling 's and its potential biases . 
1 9  For data on  this and lengthier discussion , see Whale (1930) . 
20 See Rettig ( 1978 ) . I thank Richard Tilly, who was Rettig's thesis advisor , for 
providing me with the data. 
2 1  The firms in Saling 's are reported alphabetically within each sector. In order to 
arrive at a representative cross section of sectors , I divided the number of pages in the 
1900 volume of Saling 's by the number of firms to be sampled . I then used this quotient 
to count the number of pages between firms to accept for the sample . I included the first 
firm whose entry fell on or after the assigned page while also fitting the IPO date criterion. 
The dating of IPO's  was chosen to partly offset the bias introduced into the first group of 
firms by the criterion of pre- 1880 founding. The firms in both samples are aggregated into 
nine sectors : mining and smelting, metal and machinery, textiles , chemicals , electrical ,  
construction ,  transportation and shipping, food products, and miscellaneous (firms not 
fitting the other eight sectors) . 
22 The source gives a separate founding and incorporation date or indicates previous 
corporate forms for a few firms . All such firms were excluded . It is possible that all 
38 
transformed firms are indicated, but the source does not explicitly state that this is the 
case. 
23 See Passow ( 1905 ) on the wide variation in the importance of the supervisory 
board between firms . 
24 The period of transition and factors leading to the growth of banking and indus­
trial networks is analyzed in Fohlin ( 1996c, forthcoming) . 
25 The Great Banks are listed in the previous section. All other banks are considered 
small (provincial) banks . 
26 Hall ( 1991 ) , Kaplan and Zingales ( 1996) , and Whited ( 1992 ) all employ an al­
ternative approach based �:m estimating Euler equations of investment dynamics . This 
method avoids the often-troublesome issue of measuring q .  
27 This approach is  analogous to running separate regressions for each category of 
firm, but using one regression spares degrees of freedom. 
28 Econometric results confirm this idea. Cash flow alone yields similar , though 
larger, coefficient estimates as stock liquidity alone . When the two variables are included 
together, one variable obtains coefficient estimates that have the opposite signs as those 
found in specifications in which the variables appear independent of one another. 
29  Selectivity bias could go in either direction . If banks pursue attachment in order 
to facilitate ex-post monitoring of investment outcomes of riskier firms , then the firms 
with bank-attachments are likely to have a tendency toward tighter liquidity constraints .  
If firms pursue attachments to banks in order to signal their creditworthiness to investors , 
then attached firms might not be those with the greatest tendency toward financing 
constraints .  Finally, if bank attachment has little to do with monitoring, and in reality is 
a means of earning profits off of firms known to be successful , then attached firms might 
be among the least liquidity constrained . 
30 Recall that the data is mean-differenced, and thus the model does not include 
firm indicator variables . Though coefficients for the annual indicator variables are not 
reported, some of them are statistically significant-suggesting, not surprisingly, that 
investment has a cyclical component . The period under study was generally expansionary. 
The sharp downturn of 1907 was brief and created no long-term, recessionary effects .  
3 1  Houston and James ( 1996) actually find similar effects to those in the current 
study, yet the authors interpret them in line with other studies . 
32 The details of this case are laid out in Saling 's, Part II (1904/5 ) , pp. 1 760-1 and 
( 1905/6 ) , pp. 1605-6 .  
33 Given the possible under reporting of the supervisory board membership prior to 
1 90 1 ,  it is possible that a bank director sat on the firm's board, but was not in one of the 
39 
top positions (chair or vice chair) . Fohlin ( 1995 ) describes the possible under-reporting 
in the source. 
34 It would be possible to use a limited influence estimator, such as the one pro­
posed by Huber (1973 , 1977) , but that method seems only slightly less arbitrary than 
deleting the apparent outlier. The Huber estimator is less arbitrary, because it down 
weights uniformly all observations exceeding a given tolerance level. This estimator is 
implemented in Fohlin (1994) in the case of Italian industrial finance , and an alternative 
solution to the same problem is offered in Fohlin ( 1996a) . Though they do not report the 
results ,  an apparently similar estimator is used in Kaplan and Zingales (1996) . If, as in 
the current case , the underlying data are generated by a logical , plausible process , then 
it seems preferable to retain the observation and clarify the situation that created it . 
35 In addition , the random effects model includes intercept terms (the indicator 
variables) for each category of attachment . Since there was almost no change in category 
over the period, these terms were excluded from the fixed effects model . 
36 Jeidels ( 1905 ) , as quoted in section II ,  claimed that bank control was maintained 
via voting rights, though Wellhoner ( 1989) has demonstrated only limited control in the 
few, prominent cases he studied . 
37 This phenomenon is mentioned in Jeidels ( 1905) and Riesser ( 1910 ,  1 9 1 1 ) as well 
as the more recent work of Sturmer, Teichmann, and Treue ( 1994) . While these sources 
are somewhat biased in favor of the banks , it is likely that in the case of stock price 
manipulation , the stories hold some validity. 
38 Such studies range from complimentary to agnostic to critical . See, for example, 
Eistert ( 1970) , Neuberger and Stokes ( 1974) , and Riesser ( 1910 ,  1 9 1 1 ) . 
39 On the subject of financial systems and real fluctuation see Bernanke and Gertler 
( 1 989) . Also see Temin ( 1994) and White ( 1986) for empirical studies questioning the 
relative susceptibility of universal banking systems . 
40 Fohlin ( 1994) gives a table covering all great-bank board positions in 1910  (the 
data for which derives from Sombart ( 1909 , 1913) ) . The overall patterns correspond 
closely to those arising in the current samples . 
4 1  Private banks existed long before universal banks , and they are thought to have 
financed mining companies earlier on. Nonetheless, the mining industry was highly de­
veloped well before interlocking directorates became widespread. 
42 The narrowness of previous work stems partly from the fact that a great deal 
of primary source material was lost during World War IL The most complete records 
exist for the largest firms , and for many firms , stock market yearbooks contain the only 
remaining record of the firm's existence . War damage and absence of published records 
explains why privately-held firms are nearly impossible to study in any systematic or 
comprehensive fashion . 
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Table IA 
Sample Means by Firm Type 
Figures are calculated for all firm-years fitting the criteria. Long-lived firms are those in continuous existence between 1880 
and 1913. !PO firms are those whose initial public offering ocurred in or after 1880. See text for detailed explanation of the 
data source, sampling procedure, and splitting criteria for bank attachment . Investment , liquid assets, revenues, and profits 
are normalized by the stock of fixed assets at the beginning of the period. Net worth (share capital plus reserves) and fixed 
assets are given in thousands of Marks . Standard errors are. in parentheses. Means comparison tests are provided in Table IB.  
Long-lived Firms IPO Firms 
Variable Attachment with:  
No Small Great Combined No Small Great Combined 
bank bank bank banks bank bank bank banks 
Investment 0 .02 0 .05 0.02 0 .06 0 .00 0.00 0 .1 1 0 .03 
(0 .13) (0 .28) (0 .10) (0 .21 ) (0 . 04) (0 . 10) (o .41) (0 . 16) 
Short-term 0 .42 0. 83 0.47 0 . 50 0 .59 1 .95 0 .21 0 .63 
liquid assets (0 . 63) (1 .02) (0 .30) (0 .65) (0 .26) (2.83) (0 .22) (1 .35) 
Total 0 .50 1 .30 0 .68 0 . 75 1 .05 2.29 0 .22 0 .73 
liquid assets (0 . 65) (2.14) (0.52) (0 .95) (0 .  73) (2.96) (0 .22) (1 .40) 
Revenues 0 .43 0 .62 0 .26 0 .28 0.32 2.07 0 .24 0 .39 
(0 .33) (0 .54) (0 .18) (0 .22) (0 .16) (4 .04) (0 .14) (0 .31) 
Profits 0.13 0.26 0.12 0 .13 0 .02 0 .20 0 .06 0 .18 
(0.16) (0 .31 ) (0 .10) (0 .11) (0 .16) (0 .25) (0 .05) (0 .25) 
Debt/Equity 0.59 0 .59 0 .55 0 .61 0 .55 0 .96 0 .88 0 .57 
ratio (0 .40) (0 .34) (0 .25) (0 .52) (0 .33) (0 . 91) (0 .56) (0 .50) 
Tobin's  1 .66 2.12 1 .84 2.01 1 .00 1 . 18 1 .45 1 .83 
marginal q (0 .86) (1 .35) (0 .95) (0 . 74) (0 .36) (0 .39) (0 .21 )  (0 .75) 
Net Worth 5 , 033 4 , 749 10, 708 39 , 809 3, 103 3, 219 8 , 650 6, 285 
( 4 , 940) (4 , 467) (8, 305) (43, 186) ( 1 , 343) (2, 150) (7, 506) (7, 583) 
Fixed assets 5 , 940 4 , 159 7, 505 40 , 838 2, 216 2, 712 15 , 080 7, 327 
(6 , 771 ) (6 ,  635) (4, 381) (50 , 838) (1 , 214) (2, 747) ( 15 , 286) (7, 815) 
Age (years) 37.6 41 . 0  42.3 42.3 13.5 16 .2 17.7 14 .3 
(6 .3) (7. 1 ) (7.14) ( 11 .3) (6 . 7) (7.3) (7.1 )  (5 .8) 
Number of firms 15 18 7 15 5 9 5 15 
Table IB 
P-values for S ignificance Tests:  D ifference of Sample Means 
Differences are calculated for all firm-years. LL denotes long-lived firms. Long-lived firms include those in continual existence 
between 1880 and 1913, while IPO firms comprise those whose IPO fell in or after 1880 .  Investment , liquid assets, revenues and 
profits are normalized by yearly stock of fixed assets . Net worth and fixed assets are given in thousands of Marks . Columns two 
and three report p-values of a oneway ANOVA on the differences among the four bank-attachment categories for long-lived and 
IPO firms, respectively. All other columns report p-values of t-tests arising from the direct means comparison tests. NOB, SMB, 
GB, and SMGB denote no bank, small-bank, great-bank, and combined-bank attachment , respectively. 
Variable IPO vs. oneway oneway Long-lived Firms: IPO Firms : 
LL LL IPO GB vs. NOB vs. SMB vs. GB vs. GB vs. NOB vs. SMB vs. GB vs. 
NOB SMB GB SMGB NOB SMB GB SMGB 
Investment 0 .65 0 .26 0 .22 0 .94 0 .26 0 .25 0 .03 0 . 18 0 .91 0 .19 0 .34 
Short-term 0 .04 0.00 0 .00 0 .48 0.00 0 .00 0 .62 0 .00 0 .01 0.00 0.02 
liquid assets 
Total 0 .19 0 .00 0 .00 0 .07 0 .00 0 .00 0 .50 0 .00 0 .02 0 .00 0 .00 
liquid assets 
Revenues 0 .04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0 .51 0 .09 0 .01 0 .01 0 .00 
Profits 0 .28 0 .00 0 .00 0 .90 0.00 0.00 0 . 62 0 .36 0 .00 0.00 0 .00 
Debt/Equity O .o2 0 .83 0.00 0 .42 0 .91 0 .43 0 .24 O .o2 0.02 0 .67 0.01 
ratio 
Tobin's 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0 .25 0.00 0 .12 0 .25 0 .00 0 .13 0.00 0 .00 
marginal q 
Net Worth 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .64 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .81 0.00 0 .16 
Fixed assets 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0 .08 0 .04 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .36 0 .00 0 .01 
Age (years) 0 .00 0.00 0 .07 0.00 0.00 0 .26 0 .99 0 .06 0 .20 0 .40 0 .03 
Number of 643 491 152 159 249 190 242 46 56 67 97 
observations 
Table II  
Fixed Effects Estimates of the Investment Equation 
Dependent Variable is gross investment normalized by base-year fixed assets .  Standard errors 
are in parentheses . Investment and liquidity are normalized by fixed assets .  Annual indicator 
variables are included as exogenous variables, but their coefficient estimates are omitted from 
the table. See text for model specifications and variable definitions . P-values for F-test of joint­
significance of regressors and for Hausman Chi-square test of fixed versus random effects are 
given at the end of the table. 
Long-lived Firms: All Firms: 
Constant -0.25***  -0 .24***  -0.2 1  * * *  -0 .2 1  * * *  
(0 .07) (0 .07) (0 .06) (0 .06 ) 
Lagged investment 0 .09* 0 .09* -0.01 0 .02 
(0 .05) (0 .05) (0 .04) (0 .04 ) 
Liquid assets -0 . 12* - 0. 1 1  -0. 1 2  -0.09 
(0 .07) (0 .07) (0 .08) (0 .07)  
Revenue growth -0.02 -0 .02 -0.02 -0 .02 
(0 .02) (0 .02) (0 .02) (0 .02 ) 
Tobin 's marginal q 0 . 1 9***  0 . 19* * *  0 . 1 7***  0 . 1 6* * *  
(0 .05) (0 .04) (0 .05 )  (0 .04) 
Small bank x stock liquidity 0 .26***  0 .25* * *  0 .26***  0 .23* * *  
(0 .07) (0 .07) (0 .08) (0 .07) 
Great bank x stock liquidity 0 .28***  0 .35* * *  0 .27***  0 .36* * *  
(0 . 10) (0 . 1 1 ) (0 . 1 1 ) (0 . 1 0) 
Combined banks x stock liquidity 0.38***  0 .48* * *  0 .37***  0 .45 * * *  
(0 .08) (0 .09) (0 .08) (0 .08 ) 
Small bank x revenue growth 0 . 1 7***  0 . 1 7* * *  0.02 0 .02 
(0 .05) (0 .05)  (0 .02) (0 .02 ) 
Great bank x revenue growth 0.03 0 .02 0.02 0.02 
(0 .03) (0 .03) (0 .03) (0 .03 ) 
Combined banks x revenue growth 0 .01 0 .02 -0.02 0 .00 
(0 .07) (0 .06) (0 .06) (0 .06 ) 
* Coefficient significant at 10  percent or better . 
* *  Coefficient significant at 5 percent or better. 
*** Coefficient significant at 1 percent or better. 
------
----- -
---- --
- ---
--- --- - - -- - -
- --- - - - ---- -- -- ---
- - - ---
-
-
Table II,  continued 
Fixed Effects Estimates of the Investment Equation 
Long-lived Firms: All Firms :  
Small bank x marginal q -0.07**  -0.06* -0.07**  -0 .04 
(0.03) (0 .04) (0 .03 ) (0 .04) 
Great bank x marginal q -0. 1 1 **  -0 . 1 1  * -0.07 -0 . 13* *  
(0 .05 ) (0.07) (0.05 ) (0 .05 ) 
Combined banks x marginal q -0 .15***  -0 . 16***  -0.09**  -0. 1 1 * * *  
(0.05 ) (0 .06) (0 .04) (0 .04) 
LTR x liquid assets 0 .20 0 . 18  
(0 .32 ) (0 .31 ) 
LTR x liquid assets (small banks) -0 .29 -0.28 
(0 .29) (0 .28 ) 
LTR x liquid assets (great banks) -0.48 -0. 22 
(0 .39 ) (0 .36 ) 
LTR x liquid assets (combined banks) -0 .44 -0.41 
(0 .33) (0.32) 
IPO Firms x stock liquidity -0.03 -0. 1 1  
(0 .24) (0 .23 ) 
IPO x stock liquidity (small banks) -0.05 -0 . 12 
(0 .23 ) (0 .23 ) 
IPO x stock liquidity (great banks) 0 .40 9 . 73* * *  
(0.36) ( 1 .03) 
IPO x stock liquidity (combined banks) -0 . 13  -0 .22 
(0 .24) (0 .22 ) 
LTR & IPO x stock liquidity (small banks) 0 .26* 
(0 . 14) 
LTR & IPO x stock liquidity (great banks) -9 . 74* * *  
( 1 .05 ) 
LTR & IPO x stock liquidity (combined banks) 0 .29**  
(0 . 1 5 ) 
P-value (F) [Joint significance of Xj ] 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00  
P-value (Chi-squared) [Hausman Test] 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 
Adjusted R2 0 .25 0 .28 0 . 1 9  0 . 33 
N 478 478 619  6 19  
• Coefficient significant a t  1 0 percent or better .  
** Coefficient significant at 5 percent or better . 
* * * Coefficient significant at 1 percent or bett�r .  
Table III 
Fixed Effects Estimates of the Investment Equation 
Long-lived Firms with OLD indicator 
Dependent Variable is gross investment normalized by base-year fixed assets .  Standard errors 
are in parentheses . Investment and liquidity are normalized by fixed assets . Annual indicator 
variables are included as exogenous variables, but their coefficient estimates are omitted from 
the table. See text for model specifications and variable definitions. P-values for F-test of joint­
significance of regressors and for Hausman Chi-square test of fixed versus random effects are 
given at the end of the table. 
Constant -0 .25***  -0.27* * *  
(0 .07) (0 .08) 
Lagged investment 0.09* 0 .09* 
(0.05) (0 .05)  
Stock liquidity -0 . 12* -0. 16* 
(0 .07) (0 .08) 
Revenue growth -0.02 -0.02 
(0 .02) (0 .02) 
Common equity q 0 . 19***  0 .20* * *  
(0 .05) (0 .05)  
Small bank x stock liquidity 0 .26***  0 .30***  
(0 .07) (0 .08) 
Great bank x stock liquidity 0 .28***  0 .42 * * *  
(0 . 10) (0 . 1 2 ) 
Combined banks x stock liquidity 0.38***  0 .45 * * *  
(0 .08) (0 .09) 
Small bank x revenue growth 0 . 17***  0 . 1 7* * *  
(0.05) (0 .05 ) 
Great bank x revenue growth 0.03 0.02 
(0 .03) (0 .03 ) 
Combined banks x revenue growth 0 .01  0 .00 
(0 .07) (0 .07) 
* Coefficient significant at 10 percent or better .  
* *  Coefficient significant at  5 percent or better . 
* * *  Coefficient significant at 1 percent or better. 
Table III,  continued 
Fixed Effects Estimates of the Investment Equation 
Small bank x common-equity q -0.07** -0 .08**  
(0 .03) (0 .03) 
Great bank x common-equity q -0. 1 1  ** -0 . 1 2**  
(0 .05) (0 .05) 
Combined banks x common-equity q -0. 15***  -0 . 1 5***  
(0 .05) (0 .05)  
OLD 0.05 
0 .06 
OLD x liquid assets 0 .03 
(0 .07) 
OLD x liquid assets (small banks) -0 . 10 
(0 . 1 0) 
OLD x liquid assets (great banks) -0 .22**  
(0 . 1 1 ) 
OLD x liquid assets (combined banks) - 0 . 17* *  
(0 . 09) 
P-value (F) Lloint-significance of Xj] 0 .00 0 .00 
P-value (Chi-squared) (Hausman test] 0 .00 0 .00 
Adjusted R2 0 .25 0 . 27 
N 478 478 
* Coefficient significant at 1 0  percent or better. 
* * Coefficient significant at 5 percent or better. 
* * *  Coefficient significant at 1 percent or better . 
Table IV 
Random Effects Estimates of the Investment Equation 
Dependent Variable is gross investment normalized by base-year fixed assets .  Standard errors 
are in parentheses . Investment and liquidity are normalized by fixed assets .  Annual indicator 
variables are included as exogenous variables, but their coefficient estimates are omitted from 
the table. See text for model specifications and variable definitions . P-values for Chi-squared 
test of joint-significance of regressors and for Hausman Chi-square test of fixed versus random 
effects are given at the end of the table. 
Long-lived Firms : IPO Firms: 
Constant 0 .03 -0.04 0 .02 -0.35 
(0 .06) (0.06) (0 .58) (0 .70) 
Correction term (small banks) -0.02 -0.01 0 .02 0 .03 
(0.02) (0 .02) (0 .07) (0 .06) 
Correction term (great banks) 0 .02 0 .04 -0 .54*** -0 .27*** 
(0 .02) (0 .02) (0 . 10) (0 .09 )  
Correction term (combined banks) -0.05*** -0.06*** 0 .09 0 .07 
(0 .02) (0 .02) (0 .06) (0 .05 ) 
Lagged investment 0 .05 0 .04 -0.09 0 .01  
(0 .05) (0 .05) (0 .09) (0 .07) 
Liquid assets -0.04 -0.05 -0.22 -0 .02 
(0 .04) (0 .04) (0 . 1 9) (0 . 1 7) 
Revenue growth -0.01 -0.01 -0 . 18*** -0 . 12 ** 
(0 .02) (0 .02) (0 .06) (0 .06) 
Tobin's marginal q 0 .01  0 .02 -0 .37 0. 1 5 
(0 .03) (0 .03) (0 .40) (0 .57) 
Small bank 0 .08 0 .07 -0 .07 0 .33 
(0 .08) (0 .08) (0 .64) (0 .77) 
Great bank -0.03 -0 .08 0 .43 0 .44 
(0. 1 1 ) (0 . 1 1 ) (0 .66) (0 . 74) 
Combined banks 0 . 14* 0. 1 1  -0 . 13  0 . 10 
(0 .07) (0 .07) (0 . 61 ) (0 .  72) 
* Coefficient significant at 10 percent or better. 
** Coefficient significant at 5 percent or better . 
*** Coefficient significant at 1 percent or better. 
Table IV, continued 
Random Effects Estimates of the Investment Equation 
Long-lived Firms : IPO Firms: 
Small bank x stock liquidity 0 .07**  0 .08* 0 .22 0 .04 
(0 .04) (0 .04 ) (0 . 18 ) (0 . 19 ) 
Great bank x stock liquidity 0 . 13**  0 . 15 ** -0.33 9 . 20* **  
(0.07) (0 .07) (0 .27) ( 1 . 08) 
Combined banks x stock liquidity 0 . 1 2* * *  0 .23***  0. 23 0 .09 
(0 .04) (0.05 ) (0 . 18) (0 . 1 8) 
Small bank x revenue growth 0 . 14***  0 . 14***  0 . 18** *  0 . 1 2  
(0 .05 ) (0.05) (0 .06) (0 .06)  
Great bank x revenue growth 0 .01  0 .02 
- 0 . 14 0.00 
(0 .03 ) (0.03 ) (0 . 10) (0 .09) 
Combined banks x revenue growth 0.03 0 .04 0 . 12  0 .06 
(0 .07) (0 .07) (0 . 17) (0 . 14) 
Small bank x marginal q -0.01  -0 .02 0 .44 -0 .20 
(0 .03) (0 .04) (0.41 ) (0 . 58) 
Great bank x marginal q -0.02 -0.01 1 . 1 7** *  -0 .06 
(0 .04) (0.05) (0 .48) (0 .60) 
Combined banks x marginal q -0.04 -0 .04 0 .41 -0 . 10 
(0 .04) (0 .04) (0.40) (0 .57) 
LTR 0 .01  0 . 1 1  ** 
(0 .03 ) (0 .05 ) 
LTR x liquid assets -0 .22 -3 . 20 
(0 .22 ) (2 .97) 
LTR x liquid assets (small banks) 0 . 1 6  3 . 1 6  
(0 .22 ) (2 .97) 
LTR x liquid assets (great banks) 0 . 1 6  -5 . 74* 
(0 .23 ) (3 . 1 5 ) 
LTR x liquid assets (combined banks) 0 . 1 0  3 . 1 2  
(0 .22 ) (2 .96 ) 
P(Chi-square) Lioint significance of Xj ] 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 
P(Chi-squared) [fixed vs . random effects] 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .84 
Adjusted R2 0 . 14 0 . 18 0 . 29 0 .62  
N 478 478 14 1  14 1  
* Coefficient significant a t  1 0 percent or better . 
* * Coefficient significant at 5 percent or better .  
* * *  Coefficient sip;nificant at 1 percent or better . 
Table V 
Logit Est imates: Firm Characteristics Associated with Bank Attachment 
The dependent variable-a discrete attachment-choice variable-takes the values zero through three for interlocking 
directorates with no bank, small bank , great bank, and a combination of banks, respectively. Standard errors are 
in parentheses . Investment and liquidity are normalized by fixed assets. Annual indicator variables are included 
as exogenous variables, but their coefficient estimates are omitted from the table. See text for model specifications 
and variable definitions. P-values for Chi-squared test of joint-significance of regressors is given at the end of the 
table. 
Independent 
variables 
Constant 
Investment 
Stock liquidity 
Revenue growth 
Tobin 's Marginal q 
Fixed assets 
Age 
Capital intensity 
Leverage 
Profit margin 
Dividends 
P-value of (Chi-square) 
Pseudo R2 
N 
Long-Lived Firms: 
Small bank Great bank 
vs. no bank vs. no bank 
-4 .69***  
( 1 . 08) 
0 .56 
(0 .95) 
0 .86***  
(0 . 29) 
-0 .49 
(0 . 39) 
0 . 15 
(0 .46) 
-0 .09** 
(0 . 04) 
0 . 14* * *  
(0 .03) 
0 . 01  
(0 . 03) 
-0 .01  
(0 . 00) 
0 . 50  
(0 .53 )  
-0 .04 
(0 . 07) 
0 . 00 
0 .33 
478 
-7. 19***  
(1 .42) 
-0 .03 
( 1 .37) 
0 . 64* 
(0 . 36) 
0 .31  
(0 . 2 1 ) 
2 .46* * *  
(0 . 58) 
0 . 0 1  
(0 .04) 
0 . 1 0* * *  
(0 .04) 
0 . 15***  
(0 .03)  
-0 .02***  
(0 .01 ) 
2 .62***  
(0 .53)  
-0.42***  
(0 .09)  
0 .00 
0 .33 
478 
* Coefficient significant at 10 percent or better 
* * Coefficient significant at 5 percent or better 
* * * Coefficient significant at 1 percent or better 
IPO Firms: 
Combination Small bank Great bank 
vs . no bank vs. no bank vs. no bank 
-2 .87**  
( 1 . 17) 
1 .04 
(0 . 99) 
0 . 66**  
(0 .30) 
-0 .31  
(0 .47) 
0 . 93* 
(0 . 50) 
0 . 1 5***  
(0 .03) 
0 .03 
(0 .03) 
-0 .07 
(0 .07) 
-0 .01  
(0 . 00) 
3 . 25***  
(0 .80) 
-0 . 19** 
(0 . 08) 
0 .00 
0 .33 
478 
-3 .37* 
( 1 . 96) 
2 . 28  
( 4 . 25)  
0 .40* *  
(0 . 2 1 ) 
0 .02  
(0 .06) 
1 . 67 
(1 . 51 ) 
0 .04 
(0 . 16) 
0 .03 
(0 .07) 
0 .08 
(0 .07) 
0 .01  * 
(0 .01 ) 
0 .09 
( 1 . 29) 
0 .00 
0 .44 
141 
- 2 .94 
(2 . 44) 
4 .28  
( 4 . 54) 
-3 .22* *  
( 1 .45) 
- 0 .56 
( 1 .  76) 
2 . 74 
( 1 .74) 
0 .38* *  
(0 . 16) 
0 . 02  
(0 .08) 
0 .41* 
(0 . 2 1 ) 
0 .01  
(0 .01 ) 
-0 . 78 
(3 .32) 
0 .00  
0 .44 
141 
Combination 
vs. no bank 
-3 .00  
( 1 . 98) 
3 . 05  
(4 . 50) 
-0 . 10  
(0 . 24) 
- 1 .04 
(0 .96) 
4 .09* * *  
( 1 .47) 
0 . 24 
(0 . 1 6) 
- 0 . 14* *  
(0 . 07) 
-0 .03* 
(0 . 07) 
-0 . 01  
(0 . 0 1 ) 
-0 .05  
( 1 . 53) 
0 . 00  
0 .44 
141  
Table VI 
Sectoral D istribution of Bank Attachments,  1 9 1 0  
Figures represent the share o f  sampled firms falling into the given bank-attachment 
categories , by sector. See text for detailed explanation of sorting criteria. Means are 
calculated for 1910 only. 
Sector Long-lived Firms: IPO Firms: 
no small great combined no small great combined 
bank bank bank bank bank bank bank bank 
Mining 0 . 1 1  0 .22 0 . 1 1  0 .56 0 .00 0 . 20 0 .20 0 .60 
Metal/machinery 0 .20 0 .20 0 .30 0 .30 0 . 1 7  0 .33 0 .00 0 .50 
Textiles 0 .00 0 .50 0 .25  0 .25 0 .00 1 .00 0 .00 0 .00 
Chemical 0 .00 0 .83 0 . 1 7  0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 1 .00 
Electric 0 .00 0 .00 0.00 1 .00 0.00 0 .00 0 .50 0 .50 
Construction 0 . 60 0 .00 0.40 0 .00 0 .33 0 .00 0 .33 0 .33 
Transportation 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 1 .00 0.00 0 .67 0 .00 0 .33 
Food products 0 .50 0 .33 0 .00 0. 1 7  0 .33 0 .33 0 .00 0 .33 
Miscellaneous 0 .25  0 .50 0 .00 0 .25 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 1 .00 
Table VII 
B ank p enetration variables,  1 9 1 0  
Board overlap i s  the average share o f  firms ' supervisory and executive board seats held con­
currently by a bank board member. Average number of banks represented includes firms 
with no bank representation . Share with GB chair is the proportion of firms in each sector 
whose supervisory board chair or vice-chair was occupied by a concurrent bank supervisory 
or executive board member. Variables are calculated for 19 10 only. 
Sector Long-lived Firms : IPO Firms:  
board number share board number share 
overlap of banks with GB overlap of banks with GB 
represented chair represented chair 
Mining 0 .3 14 3 .22 0 .33 0 .247 2 .80 0 .40 
Metal/machinery 0 .278 2 .30 0 .50 0 .206 1 .33 0 .50 
Textiles 0 .394 2 .25 0 .25 0 . 1 25 1 .00 0 .00 
Chemical 0 . 1 73 1 . 1 7  0 . 1 7 0 . 182 3 .00 1 .00 
Electrical 0 .538 7.00 1 .00 0 .461  4 .50 1 .00 
Construction 0 . 169 0 .60 0 .20 0 .229 0 .60 0 .33 
Transportation 0.437 4. 50 0 .50 0 .228 1 . 67 0 .67 
Food products 0 .09 1 0 .83 0 .00 0 . 137  1 .33 0.33 
Miscellaneous 0 .333 1 .75 0 .25 0 . 1 67 2 .00 1 .00 
Table AI 
Fixed Effects Estimates of the Investment Equation 
Firms Sorted by D ividend Payout 
Dependent Variable is gross investment normalized by base-year fixed as­
sets .  HIDIV takes the value one if dividends exceed the median in the given 
year and zero otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses . Investment 
and liquidity are normalized by fixed assets .  Annual indicator variables are 
included as exogenous variables , but their coefficient estimates are omitted 
from the table. See text for model specifications and variable definitions . 
P-values for F-test of joint-significance of regressors and for Hausman Chi­
square test of fixed versus random effects are given at the end of the table. 
Constant 
HID IV 
(constant for high-dividend firms) 
Lagged investment 
Stock of liquid assets 
Revenue growth 
Tobin 's marginal q 
HIDIV x stock liquidity 
HIDIV x revenue growth 
HIDIV x marginal q 
P-value (F) [Joint significance of Xj] 
P-value (Chi-squared) [Hausman test] 
Adjusted R2 
N 
* Coefficient significant at 10 percent or better. 
* *  Coefficient significant at 5 percent or better. 
*** Coefficient significant at 1 percent or better. 
-0 .2 1  * * *  
(0 .09) 
-0.05 
(0 . 10) 
0 .08* 
(0 .05) 
0 .32***  
(0 .03) 
0 .03 
(0 .02) 
0 .02 
(0 .05) 
-0 . 19***  
(0 .03) 
-0 .05* 
(0 .03) 
0 .09* 
(0 .06) 
0 .00 
0 .00 
0 .26 
478 
